University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

November 2019

The Hostile Media Effect and Its Potential Consequences:
Examining the Influence of Presumed Influence of International
Media Coverage
Zhennan Liu
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Communication Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Liu, Zhennan, "The Hostile Media Effect and Its Potential Consequences: Examining the Influence of
Presumed Influence of International Media Coverage" (2019). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8054

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Hostile Media Effect and Its Potential Consequences:
Examining the influence of presumed influence of international media coverage

by

Zhennan Liu

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
Zimmerman School of Mass Communications
College of Arts & Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Guy J. Golan, Ph.D.
Artemio Ramirez, Ph.D.
Joshua M. Scacco, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
October 21, 2019

Keywords: international communication, media credibility, corrective action, social identity and
public relationship
Copyright © 2019, Zhennan Liu
I

DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my grandfather, Zhongli Liu, whose passion for truth and justice is an
everlasting inspiration, and all my family and friends who supported and encouraged me during the
process of completing my master’s degree.

II

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to say to complete this paper results in less a sense of relief than indebtedness to my
professor, family and friends who love and support me all the time.
First, I sincerely appreciate my adviser, Dr. Guy J. Golan, for his intellectual wisdom and great
personality. Regardless of the construction of the thesis framework (theoretical, methodological, etc.)
or the overall thinking of the academic field, he provides expertise, encouragement, and patient gave
me strong power throughout the process. His great sense of humor made this journey less “miserable”
and most rewarding.
Special thank-you additionally go to Dr. Artemio Ramirez, for his guidance and suggestions offered
at critical time in this project, as well as Dr. Joshua M. Scacco, whose dedication to research is
challenging and inspiring.
On a more personal note, I would also like to thank my parents and grandparents for their many
decades of love, support and for instilling the value of education in me at my childhood.

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ································································································ iii
List of Figures ······························································································· iv
Abstract ········································································································ v
Chapter One: Background ··················································································· 1
The USA Media Coverage of China ······························································· 3
Chinese Media Coverage of the USA ····························································· 5
Chapter Two: Literature Review ··········································································· 8
Media Credibility (MC) ········································································ 8
Hostile Media Perception (HMP) ···························································· 15
HMP Psychological Mechanism ····················································· 21
Social Identity Theory ········································································· 23
Model of Influence of Presumed Influence (IPI) ·········································· 27
The Structural Equation Model ······························································ 34
Chapter Three: Method ···················································································· 36
Survey Design ·················································································· 36
Participants ······················································································ 37
Chapter Four: Measurement ·············································································· 40
Pre-exposure ···················································································· 40
Group Identification (GI) ····································································· 40
Hostile Media Perception (HMP) ···························································· 41
Media Credibility (MC) ······································································· 43
Perceived Influence (IPI) ····································································· 43
Corrective Action (A) ········································································· 44
General Demographic ········································································· 45
Chapter Five: Result ······················································································· 46
Main Variable ···················································································· 46
Group Identification ··································································· 46
Hostile Media Perception ····························································· 46
i

Media credibility ······································································· 47
Influence of Presumed Influence ····················································· 48
Corrective Action ······································································ 48
Hypothesis Test ················································································· 49
Model Analysis ·················································································· 50
Chapter Six: Conclusion and Discussion ······························································· 53
References ··································································································· 60
Appendix A: Tables ······················································································· 69
Appendix B: Questionnaire: English Version ·························································· 77
Appendix C: Questionnaire: Chinese Version ·························································· 85
Appendix D: IRB Approval Letter ······································································· 93

ii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.

T-test for Personal Opinion (PO) and Media Bias (MB) in America ············· 69

Table 2.

T-test for Personal Opinion (PO) and Media Bias (MB) in China ················ 69

Table 3.

T-test the different between American and Chinese participants on
Hostile Media perception (HMP). ···················································· 70

Table 4.

Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Group Identification (GI) and
hostile Media Perception (HMP) in America ······································· 71

Table 5.

Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Group Identification (GI) and
hostile Media Perception (HMP) in China ·········································· 72

Table 6.

Multiple regression analysis prediction participants support for
government’s public relationship in America ······································· 73

Table 7.

Multiple regression analysis prediction participants support for
government’s public relationship in China ········································· 75

iii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Theoretical Model ············································································· 35
Figure 2. Structural equation model of HMP phenomenon ········································· 52

iv

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore American and Chinese's perception towards foreign
media's coverage about their own country, as well as the main influencing factors and its
consequences of this phenomenon. We designed an online survey based on the existing literature on
hostile media perception. The sample included 301 American participants and 300 Chinese
participants (N=601).
The current study used paired sample T test, Pearson correlation coefficient and SEM
model test. Three important results were found. First, hostile media perception is widespread. In the
study, both American and Chinese participants were biased to varying degrees against foreign media
coverage about their country. Second, people's group identification was directly affects their
perception about foreign media coverage. Finally, people's acceptance of the influence of foreign
media's reports on their own countries will directly lead to participants' support the government
increase the budget on public relationship.
The main significance of this study is to discuss the hostile media perception towards
non-domestic media in different countries and its consequences. From the overall perspective, group
identification (GI), media credibility (MC), hostile media perception (HMP), influence of presumed
influence (IPI) and corrective action (A) are a set of links with causal relationship. After model
testing, we found that the results support this causal model too.
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CHAPTER ONE:
BACKGROUND

With the trend of globalization, people realize that the media coverage is no longer just a means
of domestic communication. It is also means a national propaganda and diplomatic strategy, which
has attracted countries to spend millions of dollars trying to improve their national image and
influence (Silver, 2016). Due to the innovation of network technology, new media and traditional
media have become the two main structures in national media systems and form the national public
as well (Gray, & Andersen, 2008). Various countries have begun to use media to spread and carry out
targeted public diplomacy, such as shaping national brands, opening media overseas, and even
advertising in foreign media. In order to cope with possible negative impacts, some countries have
adopted legislation to restrict them. For example, the United States' Foreign Agents Registration Act
is set up for those foreign media that may cover the media and broadcast in United States without
revealing foreign sponsorships (Lauder, 2017). It can be seen that the influence of the media
coverage can not be underestimated, which is mainly reflected in the construction of national
identity (Anderson & Glazer, 198; Deutsch, 1966; Schlesinger, 1991a, 1991b; Sheikh, Price. &
Oshagan, 1995; Higson, 2002; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011) and its impact on foreign
policy (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Hill, 1998; Sobel, 2001; Wlezien, 1996).
Many scholars have demonstrated the impact of the media coverage on social identity (ethnic group,
international and international). Blain et al. (1993) showed that the media coverage has a positive
1

impact on building national self-images. Similar results have appeared in studies such as Brookes
(1999) (BSE/CJD crisis), Nossek (2004) (terrorism and political violence), and Hall (2000)
(audiovisual material in the GATT); The media coverage also works for international. Cormack's
(1998) study which focus on the coverage of minority language media in Europe and the study on
Canada and Quebec (Antecol and Endersby, 1999) have found the positive significance of media
communication in the context of domestic context; In addition, as a topic of this research, research
on how the media cover shapes the image of foreign countries has also attracted the attention of
many scholars. Wanta et al (2004) found through content analysis that the media cover is relatively
positive or neutral to the description of the country, but the description of foreign countries is often
more negative. Moreover, Brewer et al (2003) and Wanta et al (2004) used framing, agenda-setting,
priming effects and other research methods to demonstrate the impact of international media
coverage on country identity and public opinion about other countries. Nevertheless, some studies
are focus on the impact of the media coverage on their country too (e.g. Muller, 2013). The impact of
the media coverage on people's views is very similar to the empirical findings of group psychology.
On the one hand, people use the exposure to domestic media coverage to enhance their sense of
identity, and on the other hand strengthen group identity by perceiving group biases from media
coverage (Hamilton and Trolier, 1986; Hinkle and Schopler, 1986; Struch and Schwartz, 1989).
Alternatively, the media coverage and public opinion can directly affect on individuals and countries’
impression of other countries and attitudes toward foreign policy. (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Hill,
1998; Sobel, 2001; Wlezien, 1996). Berinsky (2009) argues that when individuals are positive about
a country, they are more likely to add a positive impression of the country and are willing to support
and represent them on humanitarian intervention. For example, in the mid-2000s, Americans were
2

willing to safeguard the interests of Afghanistan by dispatch the US International Peacekeeping
Force (Page & Bouton, 2006). When people receive negative media coverage or receive hostile
media perception, people are more inclined to produce negative emotions and behaviors toward that
country.
To better understanding how the media bias in media coverage will affects people's attitudes and
behaviors in international communication. This study will examine the Americans’ views on Chinese
media coverage of the USA and Chinese’s attitude of Chinese reports on the USA media coverage.
The reason for choosing to study the media coverage of the USA and Chinese is that the political and
economic relations between the two countries are highly concerned by all around the world
especially the Sino-US trade war start in 2018. In addition, The USA and China have two completely
different political systems which made their media systems are completely different. Historically, the
media system in Western Europe and the United States has been dominated by private markets; the
Chinese media is a state-owned system controlled by the government. Under the one-party system
control, the Chinese news media are more willing to help government educate citizens and gain
citizens' political support for the party (Kennedy, 2009). We hope through this comparative surveys
can help us deeply understanding how audience attitude and behavior changes based on media bias
they receive in deferent media system.

The USA Media Coverage of China
The US media system is active, open, and even highly commercial (Bennett, 2003). Since most
media organizations are privately owned (Croteau and Hoynes, 2001), people hope the media system
3

will become the supervisor of the government and other powerful institutions and promote the
content on the market. For the American public, the media should have no government or external
interference and serve the people’s right (Stevenson, 1995, P63, p. 63). News framework is also
influenced by various mainstream ideologies, however including capitalism and opposition to
communism (Akhavan-Majid, R., & Ramaprasad, J., 1998) and even interest-driven McChesney
(2004). But no matter what, the US media has been working hard to be completely independent of
state control (Stevenson, 1995). This is reflected in the fact that journalists can sacrifice their
personal views on the government's ideological frames, labels, and assessments and trying to
evaluate the event more objectively especially on foreign news (Dorman, 1988).
In the early days, most American media reports on China reflected the US-led capitalist ideology. As
Kobland, Du and Kwan (1992) found, the main framework of these reports is “anti-communism”
(Kobland, Du., & Kwan, 1992, p. 66). Liss (2003) did a study on how China was described by four
major US media ("Washington Post", "New York Times", "Los Angeles Times" and "Wall Street
Journal") in 2000-2002. The results show that, in addition to the Wall Street Journal, other
newspapers are all believe China is a threat to the Orientalist framework. It is worth noting that the
US media coverage of China is not completely negative. Wang (1998) did a discourse and
ideological analysis research of the New York Times's report on Nixon's visit to China in 1972 shows
that the New York Times' description of China is not only positive, but also shows a more vivid
picture of China. This confirms the view of Chang (1989) that the US news media will change their
narratives of the People's Republic of China in the news as the political elites change their attitude
toward China. This view was also confirmed by a study by Yu and Riffe who studied the coverage of
US news magazines (Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report) of Mao Zedong and
4

Chiang Kai-shek (the leader of the Republic of China) during 1949 to 1976. The results of the study
show that due to the change of political views, the US media also changed the news framework of
Mao and Jiang.
However, the media reports of United States and China are mutually antagonistic, this is because of
the long-standing complex political and economic relations between two countries (Willnat et al,
2013). A study of content analysis of Chinese reports in the US media found that three-quarters of
the headlines in the US media about China are neutral, while the rest are mostly negative and almost
none are positive (Willnat＆Luo，2011; Willnat et al., 2013). Besides, the result shows most of these
reports are tend to be related to the country's internal political and foreign policy. In addition, Liu
and Li (1996) found that the US media tends to “demonize China” by focusing on China's human
rights issues (Liu and Li, 1996; Song et al., 1996; Li, J., 2009).

Chinese Media Coverage of the USA
Under the Chinese political system, the media is seen as a propaganda tool for communism
(Schramm, 1964). Due to advances in communication technology (especially the Internet), there are
some less rigorous ideologies affecting Chinese media (Xiaoming, Zhang & Yu, 1996), which has
prompted Chinese mass media to become more diverse and complex over time. (Akhavan-Majid
2004). For specific topics (such as politics, diplomacy, economics, etc.), however, the Chinese
government still control over the media system. Considering the situation of China's political society,
Chinese media reports generally tend to promote government behavior with a positive attitude. For
example, in the study by Brewer, & Ley (2012) found when faced with the crisis of food and food
security, the Chinese media will tend to promote government advocacy with a positive attitude. Zhao
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(2008) believes by faced with the expansion of liberalism on a global scale (Hallin and Mancini,
2012), although the Chinese media is rigid in some topics, it is sometimes flexible (Zhao, 2008). In
other words, in the case of commercialization of the media industry, although China is not
completely privatized (the media organization is still a subsidiary of the party state), when the
content of the report does not pose any threat to the ruling party, the government’s control will not be
so strict (Zhao, 2008). Therefore, the Chinese media is influenced by double asylum (Ren, Peters,
Allgaier & Lo, 2012).
Since the Chinese media has long been controlled by government parties and has a fixed position on
specific topics, only very limited research has focused on the study of Chinese media coverage of
US or other foreign countries. A more comprehensive study is use contextualized method to analysis
the coverage of the United States in Chinese newspaper during 2009-2014. In this study, Yan et al
(2015) argue that in the report of the United States, Chinese media reflects its functions: shaping the
national image, expressing the government's position and acting as the “gatekeeper” of Chinese
information. In the report, the Chinese media will tend to use Chinese sources and always ensure that
their content is inclined to China's position. Although the Chinese image in the report is not always
neutral or positive, the purpose is to improve current systems and practices instead of criticizing the
horizontal government (Yan et al, 2015). In addition, through the analysis of the framework of the
report, Yan found that the Chinese media often used the US issues, conflicts and unsuccessful
framing to describe the United States, and even chose to compare the favorable aspects of China
with the unfavorable aspects of the United Statesto affecting audience's views on the two countries.
In addition, most of the research on Chinese media reports in the United States focuses on different
media reports on the same incident or reports on different countries. For example, Leshuo and Chitty
6

(2012)'s research is about the US and Chinese news media reports on Xi Jinping's official US trip
during the 2012. They conducted a comparative analysis of Chinese and American news media
through framework theory and content analysis. The result shows that based on the very different
political characteristics of China and the United States, Chinese media mainly believed that the visit
was a success; while the US media believed that it was only a "challenging visit". Through the
previous review, we can find that although many scholars analyze and summarize the content of the
report itself, few scholars investigate the impact of the media cover on the audience. Through the
previous review, we can find that although many scholars analyze and summarize the content of the
report itself, few scholars investigate the impact of the media cover on the audience. This survey
hopes to provide a more constructive reference for the further study.

7

CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Media Credibility
In the study of media credibility, it often involves the discussion of media source attributes,
channel attributes, information attributes, audience attributes, etc. The earliest media credibility
research can be traced back to the 1936 study of news accuracy reporting (Charnley, 1936) and the
study of the relationship between credibility and persuasiveness of news sources by the Yale
University research team (Hovland, Irving, & Kelley, 1953). This type of research uses quantitative
methods of investigation or experimentation to explore the basic model of media credibility from the
relationship between dependent and independent variables. However, scholars have different
opinions on this type of research. Some scholars believe that media credibility is a property
description (a characteristic of the media itself (Bucy, 2003; Markham, 1968; Mulac & Sherman,
1975)), this research method can well standardize media credibility study. Others believe that media
credibility is a relationship description (the extent to which an audience believes a particular media
can be trusted (Freeman & Spyridakis, 2004; Gunther, 1992; Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, &
McCann, 2003)), this method does not well presented audience factor in the study. In fact, media
credibility is a composite concept, so a comprehensive discussion is necessarily. Specifically, media
credibility is a subjective perception that is influenced by objective factors such as source, medium,
information, and the audience itself (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). In addition, this perception comes
from the recipient, so it changes with specific information, context, and individual characteristics
8

(Freeman & Spyridakis, 2004). When media credibility is transformed into a social level, as a
comprehensive subjective perception, media credibility offsets individual differences and becomes
relatively stable. Since people's acceptance of news depends on trust, so trust is a key variable in
media effects (Tsafti, 2003; Karlsson, 2011). If individual does not trust a news organization will
directly negative impact on his consumption behavior and attitude towards the media (Cassidy,
2007). Therefore, more and more countries regard news media and transnational news as a disguised
public diplomacy tool to shape their positive national image (Wang, 2006; Dale, 2009; Gilboa, 2008;
Seib, 2010; Mogensen, 2014).
As mentioned above, media credibility is a comprehensive subjective perception. When it is
combined under different assumptions or with different concepts, it can be given different definitions.
(Self, 1996, p.421). These concepts can include the characteristics or transmitted messages and
channels of the communicator; they can also be information about the personal factors of the person
and the surrounding factors (Jadick, 2017). Scholars' research on credibility is divided into three
categories: Source credibility, Medium credibility and Message credibility. The Source credibility
study investigates how the characteristics of communicators are “influence the processing of the
message” (Kiousis, 2001, p. 382). Hovland et al.(1953) and Pornpitakpan, (2004)’s studies all
indicate that people processing information based on the trustworthiness and professionalism of the
sender/source; message credibility focuses on examining the impact of information characteristics
and information quality ( Metzger et al., 2003). Sundar (1998), Greer (2003), Fico, Richardson, &
Edwards (2004) and Cheong-Yi (2006)’s studies all detect the information and content itself make a
key role to influence audiences’ attribute of credibility; in addition, Medium credibility studies,
paying more attention to the channel that deliver information like newspaper television network and
9

so on. This type of research is presented in the study by Johnson & Kay (1998), Flanagin & Metzger
(2000) and Johnson & Kaye (2002).
The source of information can be people, groups, institutions, cultures, and ideologies, all of
which influence people’s perception of credibility by their own characteristics (Markham, 1968;
Mulac & Sherman, 1975). The study of source credibility is the earliest type of media credibility
research that can be traced back to the persuasion study of Hofland and his colleagues. Their results
show that expertness and trustworthiness are the two component elements that most influence
credibility perception (Hovland et al., 1953). Here, Expertise refers to how a communicator correctly
states a subject through his personal abilities and professionalism (Sternthal et al., 1978). Similarly,
Sundar & Nass's findings also indicate that source expertise can be used to evaluate source
credibility (Sundar & Nass, 2001). Expertise is attributed to age, social background, and leadership.
Those who are older, have a strong professional background and are leaders are considered to be
more specialized in their particular field (Hovland et al., 1953; Levine, 1978). Trustworthiness is
another predictor, if audience believes that the communicator's statement is correct, more convincing,
or allows the audience to gain something, the communicator will be considered trustworthy
(Sternthal et al., 1978; McGinnies & Ward) , 1980). Similarly, whether a person is trustworthy is also
affected by the super facial factor. If the communicator has a distinct personality, is attractive, has an
admirable appearance or belongs to an influential team, he is also considered more credible by the
audience. (Hovland et al., 1953; Sternthal et al., 1978). The follow-up researchers further explore the
composition of source credibility. For example, Berlo et al. (1970) used safety, qualification, and
dynamism as three predictors of source credibility; Whitehead (1968) added factor of competence
and objectivity base on Berlo et al(1970)’s result. Scholars realize that source credibility is one of
10

many aspects of media credibility rather than media credibility itself. A growing body of research
confirms that high-confidence messages are more likely to successfully convince audiences due to
source credibility (Hovland and Weiss, 1952; Hovland et al., 1953, 1959; Milburn, 1991) and form
public trust. (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Therefore, the credibility of media sources is a major
factor affecting the perception of media credibility (Jo, 2005). The more credible a person believes,
the higher the credibility of the information provided by the source (Freeman & Spyridakis, 2004).
Explain with the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), which is people use the source trait as a clue
to make judgments about the credibility of the information.
As with other concepts in communication research, media credibility is not just an objective
attribute of the source, but more of the recipient's perception (Berio, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969). The
credibility of this credibility makes it contextual and biased (Chaffee, 1982). Obviously, this echoes
the basic theoretical assumptions in the theory of hostile media perception (HMP), that is, the
evaluation of media performance is sensitive and influenced by individual factors such as social
identity. In some messages, separate content may be more important than the source of the message
(Metzger et al., 2003). This usually happens when there is limited information about the source
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), or when the problem involves so much personal relevance which made
audience more relies on message clues rather than cognitive-dependent logic (Petty and Cacioppo) ,
1981). Metzger et al. (2003) proposed three influencing factors of content credibility: 1. Content
structure (whether the content is organized or unorganized), 2. Message or information include in the
content (the credibility or quality of the content), and 3. Melivery or presentation style (how the
author presents the content) (Kim, 2012). Scholars have done a wider range of research on message
credibility based on previous research results. For example, research by Rains and Donnerstein
11

Karmikel (2008) found a positive relationship between message characteristics (such as statistics and
external references) and high website credibility assessments. In addition, the author also argued that
the structural characteristics of the website, such as third-party accreditation and privacy policy
statements, also play an important role in the credibility assessment of the website.
Most studies of message credibility examine the credibility of information in news from a
single country (Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). Only a few studies have compared the impact
of different news standards on the audience's trust in news outside a particular country. In the context
of cross-cultural exchanges, different forms of news media communication in various countries can
directly reflect their national image and national values. For example, China’s cross-border news
coverage heralds a positive image of China. Therefore, the position of the Chinese media is always
consistent with national interests, which is considered to be a norm in the practice of Chinese
journalism. On the other hand, US news reports are relatively more negative, not only negative for
other countries (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1981, 1983; Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001a, 2001b; Golan &
Wanta, 2003), but also for the United States itself. Given these different news practices, American
may viewers negative news is more trustworthy than positive news (Yuan, 2017).
The most common way to measure message trust is to use survey methods to explore the
composition of media credibility through factor analysis (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1970; Meyer,
1988; Rimmer & Weaver, 1987; West, 1994). One of the most important early studies was the
National Telephone Survey conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) from
1984 to 1985. The 16 items used in the study were evaluated by factor analysis and presented with
two aspects of reporting credibility and social concern (West, 1994). A second analysis of this survey
by Meyer (1988) shows that only fairness, unbiased, tell the whole story, accuracy, and
12

trustworthiness are needed. Finally, Capella and Jameison (1997) added the “contribution” factor and
collated the six scales that proposed media credibility: fair, complete, accurate, bias (reverse coded),
trustworthy, and beneficial to the community. Those scales were already used by a large number of
scholars in HMP learning (Gunther, 1992; McLemore, 2015; Feldman, 2008).
Medium credibility focuses on the role of communicators as individuals or organizations in
communication (Bucy, 2003; Kiousis, 2001). In the field of mass communication, there are mainly
three types of research on medium reliability. The first is to study the medium as the independent
variable or the main independent variable. There have been two peaks in this type of research. One
was the beginning of the media credibility study from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Most
scholars conducted large-scale surveys to collect and analyze different media channels, such as
newspapers and radio. (Abel & Wirth, 1977; Gantz, 1981). The second peak period was from the late
1990s to the beginning of this century, when the Internet emerged as a new media unit and became
popular, (Schweiger, 2000). During this time, Burns W. Roper's research was known for its
continuity. Since 1959, the Roper survey he conducted every two years provides a report on the
perception of the credibility of American social media. The 1961 turn that was often mentioned by
scholars (the number of people who chose to trust TV media exceeded the newspaper for the first
time since 1961) came from this research. (Roper, 1985). However, some scholars think Roper's
survey method is too general because the conclusions of many studies are different, depending on
the factors such as the survey object, the survey content and the survey method. For example, some
studies have found that newspapers have a higher level of credibility than television, radio, and the
Internet (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 2001); others have found that television gains more
trust (Abel & Wirth, 1977; Westley) & Severin, 1964); Most studies have found that network
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information has the lowest credibility (Pew Research Center, 2000); however, there are still some
studies on specific content that report the credibility advantage of online information over traditional
media. (Johnson & Kaye, 1998). In addition, the difference in credibility between different media is
even influenced by geographic, cultural and national factors (Gunter, Sancho-Aldridge, & Winstone,
1994).
The second type of research attempts to combine information content with channels to study the
perception of credibility of the same type of information in different media. Flanagin and Metzger
(2007) found that even if the same information is published by different media, the differences in
specific channel attributes directly affect people's credibility judgment. In addition, Major and
Atwood (1997) found that when the predictions about natural disasters were inaccurate, the level of
televisions credibility did not decrease significantly, while the level of newspapers credibility fell
sharply, which indicating that television was even more stable and sustainable. Those interested in
political news believe that online newspapers and online candidates are more trustworthy than
traditional media (Johnson & Kaye, 1998); opinion polls reported by newspapers and television
media are more credible than online media surveys (Kim, Weaver, & Willnat, 2000), etc.
The third type of study explores the impact of media on credibility perception at a more abstract
level, such as the study of the technical content of the media. Studies have shown that media
attributes strongly influence people's perception of the online news credibility. In the Internet
environment, these attributes include: the amount of visual information in the web page, the
interactivity of the website, the design style, the depth of the information, the complexity of the
website,etc (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). Since the scope of medium credibility is beyond the scope
of this study, this study will more focus on source credibility and massage credibility.
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In summary, the study of media credibility is a convenient categorization (from an academic
perspective) that allows scholars to isolate and measure the specific effects of individual variables
(such as source, medium, information, audience itself, etc.) on the perception of media credibility.
But from the perspective of the audience, trust is a result of the overall perception. This perception is
not separate, but integral and integrated. People's trust in news channels will affect their trust in news
content (Greer, 2003), resulting in a perception of media bias (Fico, Richardson, & Edwards, 2004).

Hostile Media Perception （HMP）
）
Since mass communication has noticed the importance of the audience in communication,
many scholars have investigated the audience's feelings about receiving the message. The media
credibility mentioned above and the Hostile Media Perception are all the important part of the
category. Hostile media perception phenomenon was first noticed by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). In
their experiments study, two different groups were investigated: Dartmouth and Princeton. The
partisans were asked to watch the film "particularly rough gridiron struggle" at the same time and
were asked about their personal views on the film. The results showed that although the two groups
watched the same movie, Dartmouth fans saw Princeton's cruel provocation, and Princeton fans saw
the continued pattern of Dartmouth's atrocities. Stevenson and Greene (1980) conducted an
experimental investigation in the 1976 presidential election. In the experiment, the investigators
asked participants to read positive and negative news stories about candidates Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter. Although the findings are difficult to interpret, they point out that participants have
produced more or less media bias in articles that are not biased. The first person to explicitly use the
term "hostile media effect" was Vallone, Ross and Lepper (1985). In the experiment, the
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investigators showed the media cover of the 1982 Beirut massacre to pro-Arab and pro-Israeli
students, and asked for their views on the report. The results confirmed the existence of media bias,
the participants believed the report was more favorable to the other side and think the neutral person
would be more inclined to sway to the other side after reading the report. The authors made two
interpretations of the results of this study. First of all, they pointed out that the two sides may have
recognized the balanced coverage of the news reports on both sides, but based on the amount of
evidence they stored on their own, it would be unfair about 50 to 50 balances, so the audience feels
that the media is biased. Therefore, the audience feels that the media is biased and more maintains
the opposition; the author's other interpretation of the result is that this is an instinctive cognitive
bias (in the negative direction), which leads to a completely different idea. Although the media report
is composed of 50 white to 50 black (balanced gray), but White believes that it looks 100% black,
and the black also feels that the report is white, thus causing both sides to misinterpret the report is
biased. As more scholars further study and research, more explanation mechanisms for HMP are
proposed, including Theory of information processing, the theory of bedding effects and the Social
Identification theory. We will conduct detailed analysis in the following sections.
Like other theories, the early development of HMP was based on repeated experiments on
theory, and the same or similar research methods were applied to different objects and fields to
measure the applicability limits of the theory, such as, a study about Sarajevo market explosion in
1994 (Matheson & Dursun, 2001), A comparative survey of Republican and Democratic members in
the 2004 presidential election (Hoffner & Toohey, 2007) and so on. These early studies focused on
controversial topics, selected objective reports, and conducted questionnaires or experimental studies
on people with opposing positions or conflicting views. Fifteen years after the publication of Vallone
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et al., Gunter, Christen, Liebhart, and Chia proposed the concept of "relative hostile media effect" in
2001. They believe no matter the types and positions of the content, the opposing parties will always
have completely different perception. This conclusion extends HMP's research to all positions and
general topics. One of the most famous experiments is study by Gunther and Chia (2001). They
asked participants to read the same report about against to use primates as test item and doing a
nationwide survey. The results showed that the supporters believed that the media was strongly
hostile to their own side; the participants of the opposition also expressed a certain degree of media
bias. This means the perception of media hostility is truning from the direction of the media which is
opposed to oneself to the degree of media bias which both sides feel media bias but the degree is
different. Guther & Christen (2002) also found the evidence of relative hostile media perception in
the study about issue coverage of physicianassisted suicide. Thus, the essence of media hostility
perception is not the objective bias of media content, but the deviation between the subjective
perceived of media and self-view （Hwang, Pan & Sun, 2008）Interestingly, the definition of HMP is
that party members will generate Hostile media perception for a media message that is not biased,
and thus may case the rejection to useful messages. However, the meaning of the relative hostile
media is somewhat different, which may make participants not being able to effectively identify bias
in the bias information. The study of "bias against bias" basically still stays in a single test of hostile
mediation of one party's supporters and neutrals, without comparing them. Therefore, it will lead to
the study of relative hostile media perception still test of single media inclination, and it is irrelevant
to of different groups of people. But it is undeniable that the concept of relative media expands the
scope of scholars' research on media hostility (Gunther & Chia, 2001) and combines media views
and personal views into one relationship element. Han & Kim (2011) also summarizing that HMP is
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indeed a ubiquitous medium (r=296) media effect based on his study (meta-analysis of thirty-four
studies of HMP).
The results of a large number of scholars have shown that both media hostility and relative
media hostility are influenced by audience involvement and prior beliefs (including media positions,
sources and reach). First, the audience's involvement is the primary factor affecting HMP.
Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken (1994) pointed out that the results of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
research have indicated that the participants in both parties have indicated that the TV news reports
they watch are negative and biased against themselves. Similar studies include Hwang, wt al. (2008)
for bone marrow stem cells, Kim (2011) on topics such as global warming and etc. These results
support that if people's partisanism is stronger, they stronger HMP they will perceive. It should be
pointed out that the degree of involvement is not limited to political factions, but also includes
occupation, religion and so on. As the research progressed, Chol, et. al. in 2009 divided the
involvement into value-relevant involvement and outcome-relevant involvement. The former is a
type of identity that combines personal and social values (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). In other words, it
is a theoretical framework for people to judge the impact of their social behavior on society (Sheriff
& Cantril, (1947); The latter one represents the impact of the outcome of a specific event and
behavior (Johson & Egaly, 1989). In most cases, the result of this behavior is a short-lived rather
than make a long-term social influence. Value-relevant involvement is one of the important factors
affecting HMP. Cho & Boster (2005) shows a study of value-, outcome-, and impressive-relevant
dimensions. Both Value-relevant and outcome-relevant involvement are closely related to HMP, but
the impact of value-related involvement is more pronounced. This is because value-relevant
involvement directly reflects people's basic values and identities. When people feel HMP,
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sub-consciousness is more likely to lead people to attitudes and behaviors against; outcome-relevant
involvement, however, usually arises from the resolution of a specific thing, so people tend to
carefully sort out the conditioning and content of the event, and tend to solve it in a more rational
way, such as discussion, negotiation, etc. (Choi, et. al., 2009).
Secondly, the audience's prior belief is another important element of the impression of HMP. In
here, ‘prior belief’ refers to people's understanding of other factors in media content, including
media positions, sources and media reach. It is often difficult for an audience to have the opportunity
to contact the information itself. The general information is transmitted to the public through media’s
re-creation and re-dissemination. Therefore, scholars have found from experiments that when the
same piece of information is passed to different ‘packaging’ and then passed to the audience, the
participants will give different evaluations. In a study of Arpan & Raney's (2003) report on college
football games, the researchers provided the same story to the participants and noted that the
messages were from local media, media in the region where the opponent was located, and media in
other neutral regions. Participants believe that although the reports in the neutral region are neutral,
the news from the other side has still been biased. This result proves that different levels of HMP are
generated due to different sources. In addition, Arpan, Bae, Chen & Greene (2011) also got disparate
evaluations of various media platforms because different political parties they stand. The study
found that Democrats apparently felt strong hostility when watching Fox News; the Republicans, on
the other hand, believed that the news reported by the ABC, CNN, CBS AND NBC platforms was
more hostile. It can be argued that people will make heuristic perceptions based on their previous
stereotypes of the media platform.
In addition, the information source and media reach are also important factors of people’s prior
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belief which will influenced on people’s HMP about media. Reid (2012) presented the same report to
two different groups and informed one group the news is from in-group and told the other group it is
an out-group news. The results and expectations have been consistent, participants believe that
sources from out- group are full of hostility, and the news from in-group is positive. Iord, Ross &
Iepper (1979) argue that those two phenomena are due to the fact that people will accept the same
position message without thinking, and ignore or dilute the opposite voice which is called bias
assimilation. In general, messages from the out-group will trigger HMP; and in-group information
will trigger the audience's bias assimilation, which explains the importance of people's preparation
for cognition and proves the information source is associated with HMP. Moreover, Media reach
hypothesis represent that the perceived media reach will affect the audience's perception of hostile
media effects. Dalton et al (1998) conducted a comprehensive field-based study, the investigators did
a content analysis experiments on the feedback of local newspaper services about the 1996
presidential election. Although they did not find sufficient systematic bias, the audience generally
believed that newspaper bias was ubiquitous and most of the audience believed that the newspaper
favored Clinton, followed by Bush and Pero. Most importantly, people think this prejudice is more
prevalent in newspapers with small coverage rather than the newspapers with a wide coverage. Later,
the study by Schmitt (2004) and Schmitt, Gunter & Liebhart (2004) provided strong evidence that
the media Reach would influence the HMP. He provided the same story to the participants and told
them that the report was from newspapers and college essays. As a result, the audience argued that
there were more media bias in newspaper sources. The author considered this is because people
perceive newspaper's media reach is much larger than the student's article and newspaper’s
influencing is stronger too. Therefore, evaluating reports from newspapers is more likely to have a
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negative impression on the public.

HMP Psychological Mechanism
Based on the two interpretations of the HMP phenomenon produced by Vallone et al.in 1985,
there were a large number of scholars proves that all theory of information processing, Priming
effect and Social identification theory can explain the formation of HMP. Theory of information
processing is mainly to support the dimension of the audience in HMP; the priming effect explains
the role of stereotypes in the hostile media; social identification theory is the macroscopic
interpretation framework of HMP. In the early studies, scholars focused their attention on the
prejudice perception of participants with the same report, and did not involve other external external
forms. Through these investigations and studies, scholars have introduced theory of information
processing into the interpretation mechanism of HMP. First, scholars argue that selection recall may
explanation people’s HMP. Because the audience will subconsciously remember the oppose views
and ignore the information against each other (Arinyato, Hornsey, & Gallouis, 2007). Research by
Iang, Newhagen, & Reeves (1996) also shows that when people perceive negative, angry and
negative emotions are more likely to stimulate skin's electrical conductivity and muscle activity than
pleasant positive emotions. Theory of negative memory bias further proves that people with negative
emotions have more memory of negative news than those with positive emotions (Beck, Rush, Shaw
& Emery, 1979). However, no relevant HMP studies have confirmed this interpretation so far. This
may be due to the fact that the experimental materials and the methods of detection are not well
controlled. For example, most experiments are evaluated for a specific content due to limited
materials. It does not cause measurement of recall accuracy (Schmitt, et. al., 2004). The second
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explanation is people's selective categorization. The classification and interpretation of people’s
accurate memory based on different positions can also explain the willingness of HMP production.
Shmitt (2004) showed the same story to participants in the study of whether or not to promote GM
foods, he asked partisans to recall the five most impressive content and classify their nature (positive
and negative) of the report. The results show that there is no difference in the degree and accuracy of
information recall between the opposing parties, but participants with deeper party identities feel
stronger media hostility. Moreover, Different standard of judgment is another interpretation of HMP.
This theory explains that the audience has no objection to the importance and tone of the report, but
the degree of suitability and suitability about the content (Schmitt, et. al., 2004）. Arinytao, et. al.
(2007) considered that people generally have a positive attitude towards their own values and
behaviors, so they generally ignore the effectiveness of the other content in the report and even
believe that the media reports are inaccurate and incomplete. In a study of Israelis and Pakistanis,
Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken (1994) found that participants' sense of belonging to the country directly
affected HMP, and the stronger the sense of national belonging, the stronger the perceived media as
biased.
Besides, priming theory can also be used to explain audiences’ HMP. This theory holds that
when people process information, it is not always comprehensive and in-depth, but is based on the
combination of information frequency. Anderson (1983) believes that information is generally stored
in the form of nodes in human’s brain and people built their memory by connecting those nodes
together. When a new information node is created, the associated and salience information nodes are
prioritized and help people interpret the new information. In the context of HMP, people's
‘‘stereotype’ nodes of the media are first associated, which affects people's perception of information
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(Weisbach, 2005). For example, Fox News is a representative of typical conservatism. When an
audience watches news from Fox News, they are subconsciously influenced by stereotypes and
believe that information is endorsing for conservative and anti-democratic parties. A study of
Christians in the Philippines found that based on the stereotypes of Christians against Muslims, even
if the partisans never read Republika and Sara Pembaruan's reports before, they were still considered
Sare Pembaruan ‘s report is support Muslims to against them (Ariyanto, et.al., 2007).
Finally, social identification can also explain the production of HMP. Reid (2012) believes that
although the information processing theory and priming theory can explain HMP from the aspect of
information and information docking, it does not explain HMP from the source. He pointed out that
the concept of Self-categorization of people's social identity can be explained by the source of HMP.
Since Social Identification is the focus of this study, we will use a section below to explain its
mechanisms and research results in detail.

Social Identity Theory
The social identity theory explains the deep mechanism of the hostile media effect from a macro
level. Reid (2012) argues that although the information processing theory and priming theory explain
media bias is formed in information processing, it can not explain the source of bias. Based on Chor,
Yang and Chang’s study (2009), the judgment theory (Sheri & Nebergall, 1965) can be used as the
basis for perceiving to drive perceived differences attitudes, Reid (2012) proposed a
self-classification theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), he believes that
self-categorization based on social identity is the source of hostile media perception.
Self-categorization is an extension of the social identity theory in the composition and function of
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self-concept (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Tuner, 1979) Since social identity has been proven to be
the driving force of motivational reasoning in many early studies (Hindman, 2009; Veenstra, Lyons,
& Fowler-Dawson, 2016), it is logical to play a role in HMP. Its core idea is to define social reality
by reaching an agreement with internal members based on subjectively defined. When this affiliation
is combined with self-concept, it creates an individual's social identity, which may affect the
formation and maintenance of personal attitudes (Huddy 2013).
The premise of the self-categorization theory assumes that the self is a semi-independent concept
that must depend on other elements. An extremely important component of self-identity is social
identity, such as gender, age, partisanship, etc. As Matheson and Durson (2001) mentioned
psychological self-advantage is the basic requirement of human beings. Many scholars like to regard
the centrality of the self-concept (the overlap of “social identity” and the “self-classification”) as an
important component (Cameron. 2004; Ieach et. Al., 2008). Because of the centrality and identity’s
cognitive salience impinges, people naturally tend to actively protect the particularity and superiority
of the self and the group in which they live. Fair or objective reporting is considered biased because
the report does not cater to above requirements which are considered to be positive and distinct from
other groups (Ariyanto, et. Al., 2007; Vallone, et, al., 1985). This is why HMP appears: the
subjective expectation is not in line with the facts, so any objective report is considered to be
unfavorable (Reid, 2012).
According to the self-categorization theory, social identity is cognitively defined as a feature cluster
that is defined as an in-group associated with a particular out-group. When an in-group prototype is
activated, it will be internalized and form the basis of individual’s knowledge and judgment (Reid,
2012). So when an individual is processing information, the in-group effect will influence people's
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judgment and pass this value to emotional valence (Tajfel & Turnr, 1979; Cameron, 2004). The study
by Reid (2012) explains this phenomenon well through three sets of progressive experiments. The
results show that people will feel that media bias depends on group identification; in addition, when
people have more assimilation of in-group source message will be more contrast form out-group
source massage and think the massages are strong bias against themselves. The interesting finding is
that in Experiment 1, Reid verified the phenomenon of people's multiple identities (political parties
and national identity). In other words, the definition of in-group will be change depends on the
comparison of correlation of their identity. Since in-groups are not necessarily static, they also
produce different social judgments. For example,

supporters of the Democratic or Republican party

will strongly dictate their own parties during elections and policy debates. When conflicts with
foreign countries break out, however, people are more likely to share identity as American and put
political differences in the background. Based on self-categorization, Reid (2012) argues that
panelists' bias toward information is based on the metacontrast principle (Campbell, 1985; Haslan &
Turner, 1995). In metacontras, people use membership as a reminder of information accuracy. They
want to agree and trust internal (in-group) information and members, not external (out-group).
Therefore, when the message comes from the out-group, HMP is generated; when the information
comes from in-group, there will be prejudice assimilation (Arpan & Raney, 2003).
Under this framework, if people have stronger self-categorization, the higher the awareness of
‘Group Identity’, and the wider the scope of interpretation of events by using the “in-group cognitive
model”. Sherif et al. (1965) argue that people's attitudes toward information, tasks, or events contain
three consecutive ranges: a latitude of acceptance, a latitude of noncommitment and a latitude of
rejection. The location of an event in the radius of an attitude determines how it may be perceived
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and processed. The higher the level of involvement the greater the radius of rejection will be.
Therefore, some neutral and objective information can easily enter the radius of rejection of those
who stand in a Specific position (Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965). Specific to HMP, the higher
possibility of information being excluded, the greater the degree of media bias will be. This provides
an explanation for the relationship between self-categorization and HMP, and also provides a basic
theoretical framework for information processing, media preconceptions and HMP associations.
We can realize that self-identition (self-classification) is a complex multidisciplinary concept, so
scholars examining and testing it in different ways for many years. Social psychologists focus on
people's identification of multiple groups (e.g., Gaertner and Insko, 2000); organizational researchers
focus on how to attach people to work in organization (e.g., Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994);
Political scientists focus on political identity and the relationship between political identity and
national identity (e.g., Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) and so on. Until Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz,
Halevy & Eidelaon (2008) proposed an identity model in the context of a relatively large social
classification-distinguishing models of identification. Based on previous scholars' study on social
identity perspective y (eg, Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Brown, 2000;
Hogg,

2000),

individualism

m

(eg,

Triandis,

1995;

Triandis

&

Gelfand,

1998),

nationalism-patriotism (eg, Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Bar-Tal, 1993; Staub, 2000) and
identification with organization (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Riketta, 2005), Roccas et al (2008) It is argue
that the test of people's social identity can be carried out in four aspects: importance (belonging to
the group is an important part of individuals life), Commitment (individuals are strongly committed
to their group), Superiority (compared to other groups of its kind, Their group is especially good)
and deference(there is usually a good reason for any rule or regulation that the group's leadership
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proposal). Finally, they designed a 16items questionnaire to test the four identification models. The
results show that all four models are likely to be correlated with the contribution to the group
identification (Roccas et al. 2008). In this study, we will use this Distinguishing Models of
Identification Inspecting the identification of American and Chinese in the context of HMP. Based
on the above description of social identity and HMP, this paper makes the following assumptions:
In general, people who have a strong sense of group identity are more likely to be sensitive to reports
about their group, and thus more prone to HMP. They believe that they are under more pressure to
maintain positive group impressions (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013). Therefore, in-group identification
can be one of the major mediators of HMP. There is also evidence that members with a strong sense
of identity with a group organization have a more significant perception of HMP (Duck et al., 1988;
Reid, 2012). Therefore, this study believes that HMP will prevail in both Chinese and American
participants. In addition, Chinese and American citizens with a stronger sense of identity with their
own country are more likely to feel that the foreign media is biased. Specific assumptions are as
follows:
H1: Participants will perceive media coverage as biased against their country.
H2: The higher the group identification, the greater the HMP will be.

Model of Inﬂuence of Presumed Inﬂuence（
（IPI）
）
The IPI model (Gunther & Storey, 2003) is a good explanation for the shift in ideology after the
audience receives media bias. This model was created by Gunther et al (2003) through the derivation
of the third person effect theory (TPE) (Davison, 1983). However these two concepts are contrary to
each other. TPE focuses on the influence of media information on self and others and the resulting
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behavior; while IPI research focuses on how individuals predict the impact of media on others and
thus respond by “correcting behavior” in the real world.

The IPI phenomenon is based on a more

general concept - ‘persuasive press inference’ (Gunther, 1998), which recognizes people's attention
and forms a media bias after participating in media information. Besides, people think that media
information is representative and widely disseminate, so many others will also be exposed to similar
information (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). Although they think that they are smart
enough to resist media effects, people tend to adopt a relatively naive model (for example, The
Magic Bullet Theory), based on their assumptions about other people's exposure to media
information and believe they will be influence by media. (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997;
Gunther & Storey, 2003, p. 202). According to previous research results, Shen & Huggins (2013)
examined the IPI model. The results confirm the four steps that IPI leads to individuals experiencing
media bias: 1. Self-exposure (personal contact with the media and a basic sense of information). 2.
Shift from self-exposure to perceived exposure (assume the universality and broadness of media
messages). 3. Assume that others are affected by the content of the media. 4. Adjust self-attitude and
behavioral responses based on the assumptions of others. These four steps constitute an IPI causal
chain: self-exposure → other-exposure→perceived effects on others→behavior (Shen, Huggins,
2013). This result confirms the role of IPI in perceived media bias. According to the model detected
by Shen & Huggins (2013), the IPI process is mainly divided into two stages: 1. People's perception
of the influence of media bias on others; 2. Changes of attitude and behavior for this perception.
First of all, when people think that other people pay more attention to the media, they will think
this media effect has a greater impact on others (Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod, 1999).
Gunther et al, (2003) argue that IPI consists of two parts: “assuming the influence of the media on
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others” and “the influence of presumed media influence”. People will assume that others are exposed
to similar information through their own perception of information (Gunther & Storey, 2003). The
theoretical basis of this phenomenon is the persuasive press inference theory proposed by Guther
(1998). He believes that people will form different opinions on different media and believe the
spread of these messages is common. So based on the extrapolation effect, one would assume that
other people are affected by the information when they receive it. (Gunther, 1998). Other related
researches include Gunther&Store (2003), Tsfati & Cohe (2005), etc. However, some scholars
believe that IPI should be influenced by the theoretical framework of Self-projection Theory. They
believe people should tend to think of their viewpoint is more fair and standard in public ((Gunther
& Chia, 2001). Christen et al (2002)'s study of United parcel services of 1997, however, shows that
Both Teamster Union and UPS believe that there is media bias, but public opinion is consistent with
their own views. Beside, the college students who participated in the physics field of the
questionnaire believed that the media reports were neutral and supported their own views, and public
opinion should be consistent with the media viewpoint (their own views). The author believes that
this may be related to the strong demand for public opinion support, which offsets the impact of
media bias on the audience and overestimates the consistency of public opinion. Finally, Gunther &
Chia (2001) found in the experiment that the two opposite theories of persuasive press inference
theory and Self-projection Theory occur simultaneously. people will think in the Persuasive press
inference that media reports under HMP will influenced public to against themselves (Vallone et, al,
1985), but under the influence of Self-projection theory, public opinion should be consistent with its
own views and will not affected by media (Gunther & Chia, 2001). A survey of whether primates
should be used as experimental products found existence of both Persuasive Press Inference and
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Self-projection Theory. The results show that Persuasive Press Inference is more effective than
Self-projection in this research, and the public opinion has been guided to a certain extent (Gunther
& Chia, 2001).
Second, the IPI model also explains the changes in attitudes and behaviors that people
generate under the influence of media bias. As mentioned earlier, people are consider others will
more easily influenced by media and the information they explore will reform their thoughts and
behaviors（Gunther，1998）。Thus, individuals are willing to guide others' thinking and actions by
changing their own attitudes and behaviors (Gunther, 1998; Paek & Gunther, 2007). When people
perceived media bias, the attitude changes are mainly reflected in: evaluation of media credibility
will be decrease, change the media's interest and informative cognition, generate media indignation
and lead people to worried about public opinion (minority group alienation). Tsfati & Cohen (2005)
found that due to hostility to the media, people's evaluation of media credibility declined. They
investigated the attitude of Jews settled in the Gaza Strip to the reports related to their shelter. As a
result, it was confirmed that media bias was related to media credibility. It also found that media
credibility is positively related to democratic trust, and that trust in democracy was negatively
correlated with violence against the government. Therefore, media bias will also succinctly affect
people's intention to resist the government. Coe et. al. (2008) found that media bias is positively
related to whether the media is interesting and informative. Both liberal and conservative
participants believe that The Daily Show is more biased and less interesting and informative than
CNN and Fox news. At the same time, conservatives believe that Fox News is more interesting than
liberals, which confirms the opposition between liberals and conservatives. In general, when people
think that a media has less prejudice, then his interest and knowledge are stronger. In addition,
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Hwang, Pan & Sun (2008) found that media bias also led to media indignation, which they defined
as the anger, disgust and resentment of the audience due to media coverage. Interestingly, however,
their research found that this media indignation may increase the probability that an audience will
engage in media interaction and expose more relevant news. The Arpan & Nabi (2011) study also
validates this conclusion. So more biased people think the media is, the more angry they will be.
Moreover this kind of hostile media perception will lead the audience more worried about the public
opinion. Many studies have studied this possible consequence. Suppose people think that media
content reflects a majority opinion, or that the audience believes that the media will influence the
opinions of others. Therefore, it affects public opinion. However, some scholars have verified the
research on the contrary. They believe that people's mediation analysis of information will produce
both hostile media effect and general media effect (Gunther et al., 2001; Gunther & Christen, 2002;
Choi et al. 2009; cf. Huge & Glynn, 2010), in the case of Oita, the influence of the latter is often
greater than the former, so even in the case of public perception of HME, public opinion is
considered to be the same as themselves. However, Tsfati (2007) pointed out in the study of Arabs in
the State of Israel that when the group in which it is in a weak position, the HMP felt by Arab group
became particularly strong, resulting in the Arabs in Israel felt local (Israeli) have more negative
impact on them and leading minority felt group alienation. It should be pointed out that the
minimum group alienation reflected in this research is not directly caused by HMP or other people's
behavior, but the influence that the audience feels on others under the influence of HMP.
In addition, has implication for behavioral intentions. If people think that others are more
susceptible to harmful effects than themselves, they are more likely to take action (Huh et al., 2004).
Therefore when people think the media is bias, and the information has obvious intentions of
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malicious or over-operation, and will have a disproportionate impact on the public (TPE), people
will try to "correct" the information they believe it is "wrong" (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014). The
corrective behavior hypothesis was first found in Davison's (1983) seminal article outlining the
third-person effect. The author shared his anecdote in the political elections. When he received a
leaflet from a candidate he did not support in his mailbox, he thought he needed to make a neutral
act, so he produced and distributed the flyer about the candidate he supported. In the beginning, this
phenomenon was considered to be related to the third-person effect (Sun et al., 2008) but later it
confirmed to be also related with HMP and presumed media influence (PMI) (Rojas, 2010). Davison
also mentioned other similar study in the article. For example, in Tsfati, Ribak & Cohen’s study
(2005) mentioned that when parents think that their children have a greater influence on violent
media content, they will monitor the children watching TV. If parents think that other children have a
greater impact on their children, they will also monitor the children's social relationships; Su, Shen
& Pan (2008) found that students are willing to participate in the correction of "reality TV
programs." Similarly, Neuwin, Frederrivk & Mayyo (2002) also found that those who perceive more
media effects are more willing to participate in controversial topics.
The most studied behavioral effect of HMP and IPI has been support the censorship of the
information which perceived negative influences (Gunther, 1995; McMeed, Eveland & Nathanson,
1997; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Wei & Lo, 2007). Gunther (1995) found that people tend to
underestimate the extent to which the media influences themselves and think those news content is
acceptable. Wen assessing the impact of news on others, however, they usually believe those news
are generally unacceptable. In other words, the more cautious they are, the more likely they want to
protect others by supporting government censorship. This phenomenon is consistent with the
32

paternalism argument. In essence, People think they can handle themselves well with media bias, but
others need to be regulated when they receive bias from the media. Lo, Lu & Hou, (2015)’s study
about provide evidence supporting the relationship between hostile media effect and desire for
censorship, the result shoes that the participants’ controversial news had a greater impact on others.
In addition, people also believe that they may oppose the government's policy of restoring imports of
US beef. Similar results have appeared in the reports of Xu and Gonzenbach (2008), they
demonstrated that the hostile media perception were positively associated with the influence on
others and support for censorship as the corrective action. Moreover, In a study on presumed
influence of American news about China on Chinese people (Wei, Lo & Golan, 2017) indicate that
when residents of Country A feel the media bias from country B, they will think that their
government should take action to influence the media of Country B to correct any uncompromising
reports of their country. In other words, residents of country A will assume that their country's
influence has significant and positive predictive power, so they will support their global public
relations campaign to present their ideal image against negative reports from foreign media (Wei, Lo
& Golan, 2017).
In the present study we designed to provide a test of the relationship between IPI and corrective
behavior components of the HMP. Following Guther (1995), Rojas et al.(1996), Lo, Lu & Hou,
(2015), and Wei, Lo & Golan (2017) we predict::
H3:

IPI will be positively related to people support for government’s global engagement (increase

global public relation funds; increase the fund for Multilanguage television services; increase funds
that can influence foreign social media and improve foreign media’s coverage of US/ China)
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The Structural Equation Model (SEM)
In order to better explore the relationship between the theories and phenomenon involved in this
study, we established a new model. Structural Equation Model (SEM) was first proposed by Bock
and Bargmann in the field of psychometrics in the 1960s. It is a multivariate statistical method based
on variable covariance matrix to analyze the relationship between variables and makes it possible to
construct all the potential factors into complex theoretical relations (Bollen, 1987). This model will
help us frame A model that can support the structure of the variables of this study. Thus the model in
this study has set up 5 potential variables which include: theoretical connection of Group
Identification (GI), Media credibility (MC), Hostile Media Perception (HMP), Influence of
Presumed Influence (IPI) and constructive Action(A). Besides, corresponding observation variables
were set to better support our potential variables. For details, please refer to the measurement section.
Through testing various variables in the model, we will further explore whether the GI of
participants will act on HMP, and try to prove the relationship between IPI and Corrective Action
(support the government to strengthen the public relations budget). As shown in figure 1, the
relationship we established is: people's Group Identification will directly act on HMP and MC, and
MC will negatively affect people's perception of media bias. As an intermediary between HMP and
corrective action (A), IPI will make participants more inclined to support the government to carry
out relevant global public relations activities.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model
*Information provided by the student for the purposes of this study.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHOD
Survey Design
This study will use the online survey to investigate of Americans/Chinese views on Chinese
media coverage of US/ American media coverage of China. Survey, as one of the most commonly
research methods, have been used by many scholars in surveys related to national imagery. Custodio
& Gouveia (2007) evaluated the cognitive image of Portugal based on the media coverage during
2004 European Football Championships. Similar studies include Giraldi, Ikeda, & Campomar (2011)
and Godey & colleagues (2012). In addition, the questionnaire method is often used in research on
HMP too and contributed a lot (Hwang, Pan & Sun, 2008; Choi, Yang, & Chang, 2009; Rojas, 2010;
Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Feldman, Hart, Leiserowitz, Maibach & Renouf, 2015). Although both
questionnaires and experimental methods (most studies) are commonly used in HMP research
(Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Lim & Golan, 2011; Brubaker, 2012),
Hansen & Kim (2011) did Meta-analysis for 34 HMP studies and indicates that there is no statistical
significance about whether using experimental methods or questionnaires method in the HMP study.
Moreover, because of the development of technology, Yang & Wang (2018) believes that the online
questionnaire is an approach to international education scholars and researchers as an alternative
research (e. g., Hwang, Pan & Sun, 2008, Brubaker, 2012; Liu, 2017, etc). Therefore, this study will
collect research data through Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com), an online survey platform in the US,
and AskForm (www.askform.cn), an online survey platform in China. Qualtrics website was founded
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in 2002, and its clients include American universities, Barnes & Noble, CVS Caremark, Geico,
Microsoft and other companies; AskForm was established in 2001, China Unicom, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Merck, and Multinational clients such as the American Marketing Association provide
services.

Participants
Researchers will recruit students, professors and employees from different fields to participate
in the survey and ask participants to share links with other participants through famous social
platforms and websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Wechat, Weibo and QQ. To be specific, the author
has Shared the questionnaire link on Facebook, Twitter (USA)； Wechat, Weibo and QQ (China),
asking classmates, friends and teachers to fill in the questionnaire and share the questionnaire link
again on social media to get more participants. In addition, in the distribution of questionnaires in the
United States, this study also distributed questionnaires through mTurk, and asked people who were
interested to participate in this study to answer the questionnaires. This no-probability, self-selected,
volunteer sampling method, combined with the snowball sampling method allows participants to
share the questionnaire with participants who are interested. Similar sampling methods have been
successfully used in studies by Johnson & Kaye, 2004; 2007; 2009; Kaye, 2005, 2007; Kaye &
Johnson, 2011. Since the samples are from the United States and China, the instrument will be
translated into Chinese by Chinese researchers. Considering that Chinese is the native language of
the researcher, item linguistic integrity was not a problem.
The total number of samples collected in this study was 601 (300 in China; 301 in the United
States). The proportion of men (46.1%) and women (52.3%) in the U.S. sample was roughly equal
37

(the other 1.3%). However, this proportion is somewhat different from the overall situation of
American Internet users (38.3% male, 66.7% female; See ICTFactsFigures 2017). The age
distribution of participants was relatively average, among which 18-25 years old (25.3%), 26-35
years old (37.5%), 36-45 years old (18.9%), 46-55 years old (11.6%) and over 56 years old (6%).
Among 301 respondents in the U.S., 37.9% participants had Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS),
24.3% are in some college but without the degree, 15.3% had a Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd),
10% had an associate degree (e.g. AA, AS), 8.3% had a high school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED),
2% had a professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM), 1.3% had a doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)
and only 1% participants are less than a high school diploma. In terms of race, 77.4% of the
respondents were White, 7.2% were Asian, 6.6% were Black or African American, 1.3% were
American Indian or Alaska Native, and 7.3% were refer not to answer the question. In terms of
political intention, 29.2% of the American respondents said they were independents. In terms of
political intention, 29.2% of the American respondents said they were independents. 44.9% of
respondents supported conservatives, while 25.9% supported liberals. 22.6% of American
participants were politically neutral, 55.5% were liberal and only 26.9% were conservative.
In China, total of 300 samples were collected, among which there was little difference between
male (52%) and female (46.3%) (other gender accounted 1.7%). Participants were mainly aged from
18 to 35 years old (89.3% of the total sample), while participants over 35 years old only accounted
for 10.7%. In terms of gender, this sample is very close to the proportion of Chinese Internet users.
For the age, however, the participants in this study is much younger (in the total number of Chinese
Internet users, male accounts for 52.7%, female accounts for 47.3%; 67.8 percent were between the
ages of 10 and 39. See China Internet network information center, 2019).
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Among 300 respondents in Chinese, 41.3% participants had Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS),
29.3% had a Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd), 15.7% are in some college but without the degree,
7.7% had a high school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED), 10% had an associate degree (e.g. AA, AS),
1.3% had a professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM), 1.7% had a doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)
and 3% participants are less than a high school diploma. In terms of race, 78% of the respondents
were Asian, 2.7% were multiracial or other, 0.7% were White and 18.7% were prefer not to answer
the question. In terms of political intention, 29.2% of the American respondents said they were
independents. In terms of political intention, 61% of the Chinese respondents said they were
independents. 33.37% of respondents supported conservatives, while 25.9% supported liberals. 22.6%
of American participants were politically neutral, 55.5% were liberal and only 26.9% were
conservative. In the sample, more than half (61%) of Chinese respondents said they were
independents when it came to political intentions. Supporters of the communist party of China (CPC)
account for 33.37%, with the overwhelming majority expressing strong support for CPC, while those
from other parties account for 5.3% of the total. Half (50.3%) of Chinese respondents were
politically neutral, 38.7% were liberal and only 11%were conservative.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
MEASUREMENT
Pre-exposure
Since our research is aimed at Americans and Chinese, all participants will be asked before
answering the online survey “what is your nationality?”, only the United States and Chinese
participants can continue awanser the survey.

Group Identification (GI)
To examine the role of identity variables in HMP, this study will use ‘Distinguishing Models of
Identification’ (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy & Eideison, 2008). Based on previous studies (eg,
Gaertner, Dovudio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust , 1993; Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985; see
Brown, 2000, for a review), Roccas et al (2008) believe that the model used to study the social
identity perspective can be further divided into four conceptually distinct modes of identification:
importance – How much individuals view the group as part of who they are; commitment – how
much they want to benefit their group; superiority – how much they view their group as superior
group; and deference – how much they honor, submit and revere to the group's Norms, leadership
and symbols.
By asking 382 volunteers and 102 college students to answer a 16-items survey to examine
identification with the United States. The experimental results verify the validity of the model
proposed by Roccas et al (2008). In addition, Sagiv, Roccas & Hazan (2012); Rinker & Neihbors
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(2014); Weller & Kurman (2017); Ardag & Cohrs (2017); Zhixian (2018) and other scholars also
used this measurement model in their research.
In this study, 16 items survey questions proposed by Roccas et al (2008) will be used to verify
participants' perception of group identification using 7-point response scale rating from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 16 items are include: importance (' Being American/Chinese is an
important part of my identity'; 'It is important to me that I view myself as American/Chinese'; 'It is
important to me that others see me as American/Chinese 'When I talk about American/Chinese, I
usually say “we” rather than “they”') , commitment ('I feel strongly affiliated with the USA/China’ I
am glad to contribute to the USA/China. I’m strongly committed to the USA/China'; 'I like to help
the USA/China'), superiority ('Other countries can learn a lot from the USA’; ‘Compared to other
countries, the UAS/China is particularly good'; 'Relative To other countries, the USA/China is a very
moral country'; 'The USA/China is better than other countries in all respects'), and deference ('In
times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is depends on the president'; 'All Americans
should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the country'; 'It is disloyal to criticize
the USA/China'; 'There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the USA/Chinese
leaders propose') (Roccas et. ql., 2008).

Hostile Media Perception (HMP)
Previous HMP studies examined HMP by examining people's personal opinions and perceived
media slant or media biases (e. g., Vallone, Ross & Lepper, 1985; Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther &
Liebhart, 2006). When there is a negative relationship between personal opinion and media
perception, it indicates the existence of HMP. Base on this, Choi et al (2009) argue that when the
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score of perceived media slant is away from the score of the individual opinion in the opposite
direction, the HMP will increase and she called value as the 'HMP score'. The advantage of this
measurement is that it is convenient to obtain individual differences and to explore the relationship
between HMP and other traction and the consequences of HMP (Choi et. al., 2009).
The specific process of detection is as follows: first, investigate the participants' personal views
and perceived media slant (eg Vallone et. al., 1985; Gunther et. sl., 2001). Second, average two items
to yield a single measure of perceived media slant. Finally, the HMP is calculated in two stages: a
subtracting the perceived media slant score from the individual opinion score; b. The reverse coded
score indicates the appropriate perception (HMP score). Barnifge & Rojas (2014), McLemore (2015)
and other studies have verified the validity of this calculation method.
Besides, the questions asking about the participants' personal views and perceived media bias are
refer to Gunther & Liebhart ’s research in 2006. First, when asking participants about their personal
views on US-China relations by asking “When it comes to the USA – China relationship, I support:”
using a response scale from – 4 (The USA) to +4 (China). In addition, to examining the perceived
media slant, participants were asked: "As far as you can tell media coverage of the USA/China in
China/the USA is strongly bias against or in favor of the USA/China?" ; ”About what percentage of
the Chinese/the USA media coverage of the USA/China was favorable/ unfavorable to the issue of
the USA and China relationship?” and “As far as you can tell Chinese/American journalists and
editors are strongly bias against or in favor of the USA/China?”. Responses were rating by respond
scale from 4 (strongly biased against) to +4(strongly biased in favor) with0 as the (neutral) midpoint;
the percentage answer were rating by 11-point scales varying from 0% (none) to 100% (all). This
questioning method is also often used in other studies (e.g., Perloff. 1989; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken,
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1994; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; Schmitt et al, 2004).
Moreover, this study will remove participants who do not have a (neutral) position (with a personal
opinion score of 0), as was done by Vallone et. al (1985), Gunther et al (2001), and others. The
purpose is to leave participants who have an opinion on the topic in the analysis.

Media Credibility (MC)
The media credibility test index was first proposed by Gaziano and McGrath's (1986), and then
simplified by Meyer's (1988). Finally, the six scales of media credibility be proposed by Capella and
Jameison (1997), include: fair, complete, accurate, biased (reverse coded), reliable, and beneficial to
the community. This method has been used by a large number of scholars in HMP filed (e.g. Gunther,
1992; McLemore, 2015; Feldman, 2008). Thus, this study will use these six items to measure media
credibility of Chinese media coverage of U.S. and U.S. media coverage of China by using 7-point
Scale rating from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Perceived Influence (IPI)
IPI is a phenomenon in which individuals tend to infer other people's perception about the
information (Gunther & Storey, 2003). Individuals believe others are likely to exposed similar news
with themselves due to media’s widely influences (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). Thus,
the information will easily influence others’ opinions and attitudes (Gunther & Storey, 2003, p.202).
There are many studies on this research phenomenon, including Gunther & Christen, 1999, 2002;
Mutz & Soss, 1997; Salwen, 1998 Gunther & Storey, 2003; Tsfati & Cohen, 2005). Most of the tests
for the IPI phenomenon are tested by asking participants about their own and their perceived impact
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on others. There are many scholars studying the IPI phenomenon, including Gunther & Christen,
1999, 2002; Mutz & Soss, 1997; Salwen, 1998 Gunther & Storey, 2003; Tsfati & Cohen, 2005. Most
of the tests are tested by asking participants about their own views and their perceptions about how
information may impact on others. Related studies in recent years include: Neuwirth & Frederick
(2009); Chia (2010); Ho, Ng, Leong & Tham (2015). This study will continue to use this method and
draw on the questions asked by Wei, Lo & Golan (2017). Similar usage also appears in studies by
euwieth & Frederick, 2009; Shen & Huggins, 2013; and Lo, Wei, Lu & Huo, 2015.Participants were
asked to answer “To what extent do you think Chinese/the USA made coverage of the USA/China
influences you on: (1) China/the USA (2) Chinese/the USA Government (3) Chinese/the USA values
(4) Chinese/the USA People (5) Chinese/the USA company?” To exam participants’ perception about
how media cover affects others, the other two questions had asked by replacing "you" with
"Chinese" and "people’s view in other countries" on 5-point scale, where 1 = " no influence l", 3= "
neutral " and 5= “great influence”.

Corrective Action (A)
Based on the premise of IPI, people attribute the impact of media messages to others and then
respond to this perception by changing their attitudes or behaviors (Gunther & Storey, 2003). In
other words, when people receive the “wrong” information, they are willing to “correct” it to
influence public through corrective actions. There has been a lot of research focused on corrective
behavior generated by media bias (e. g. Gunther & Storey, 2003; Cohen, & Tisfati, 2010, Rojas,
2010; Wei, Lo & Golan, 2017, etc.). Wei et al (2017) pointed out that residents of country A believe
their government should act to influence the media of country B and to 'correct' any negative
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coverage of their country when they feel the media bias from country B. Therefore, this study asks
partisans whether support for their government's global profile (increase its global relationship
budget; increase its global foreign social media engagement budget; increase its global TV
broadcasting budget; and priorities improving its image broad.) with 5-point Scales Rating from
1(Strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree).

General Demographic
Last but not the less, the questionnaire will demographic variables (gender, age, and education level).
By examine the demographic variable can help researcher gives a better description of the samples
in this study. Besides, these variables are considered related to American media coverage of China

（Andsager & White, 2007; Rojas, 2010; Kim, 2015.）and Chinese media coverage of U.S. (Yang,
2016).
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CHAPTER FIVE:
RESULT

Descriptive and judgmental statistics of each variable in this study will be presented in this
chapter, including media credibility, social identification, HMP, IPI and corrective behaviors. The
test results of the three research hypotheses are also shown below.

Main Variables
Group identification
Based on 'Distinguishing Models of Identification '(Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy &
Eideison, 2008). Fourteen questions were set in this study to evaluate the Group Identification of the
respondents. From the point of data analysis, the results of this study, all of the scales for group
identity yielded a strong reliability coefficient (a =. 945; a =.911), the additive index was computed
for American's group identification (M= 3.29, SD= 1.704). And Chinese's group identification (M=
5.35, SD= 1.108).

Hostile media perception
This study follows the method of HMP detection in Gunther & Liebhart (2006). American
participants were asked their opinions about the United States, including: US government (M=.60,
SD=1.715), foreign policy (M=.55, SD=1.541), role in the world (M=.66, SD=1.771), economic
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policies (M=.53, SD=1.743) and American people (M= -.65, SD= 2.043); And their views on
Chinese media coverage about the United States (M=-1.03, SD= 1.267), the degree they view on
Chinese media's bias against the United States (M=-.85, SD=2.552), and Chinese journalists'
attitudes towards the United States (M= -.81, SD= 1.583).
Meanwhile, Chinese participants were asked their views on China, including: Chinese government
(M= 1.80, SD=1.721), foreign policy (M=1.87, SD= 1.615), role in the world (M= 1.97, SD= 1.523),
economic policies (M=1.35, SD= 1.678) and Chinese people (M= 1.58, SD=1.713); And their views
on the American media coverage about China (M=-1.09, SD= 1.950), the degree they view
American media coverage is bias against China (M=-.92, SD= 1.840), and their attitudes towards
China (M= -1.24, SD= 1.632). Those two scales are all got a strong reliability coefficient in both
American (a=.826) and Chinese (a=.875) region.

Media credibility
Participants were asked to rate foreign media coverage of their country based on a series of
measures of media credibility for life. Mean and standard deviation of media credibility evaluation
of American participants as follow, fairness (M=-.59, SD=1.155), accuracy (M=.55, SD=1.231),
credibility (M=-.60, SD=1.307), completeness (M= .57, SD= 1.288), and whether it is good for
society (M= .21, SD=1.368).
In turn, the mean and standard deviation of Chinese participants' evaluation of media credibility as
follow, fairness (M=-1.25, SD=1.360), accuracy (M=-1.13, SD=1.250), credibility (M=-.78,
SD=1.287), completeness (M= -1.18, SD= 1.350), and whether it is good for society (M=-, 81,
SD=1.399). Since all of the scale for media credibility yielded strong reliability coefficients, a =. 735
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and a =. 880.

The Influence of Presumed Influence
We asked participants of both countries to evaluate the impact of foreign media on domestic
packages, specifically divided into three dimensions. American participants were asked to rate the
impact of Chinese media reports about United States on Americans (M=1.96, SD=1.163), on
Chinese people (M= 3.49, SD=1.272), and on people from other countries (M=2.86, SD=1.062).
Chinese participants were asked to rate the impact of U.S. media coverage of China on Chinese
(M=3.12, SD=1.156), on Americans (M= 1.349, SD=1.085), and people from other countries
(M=3.28, SD=.944). The data of the United States (a=.907) and China (a=.865) all showed that the
IPI scale had a strong reliability coefficient, so the index was also computed for this variable (M
=3.18, SD =.630).

Corrective Action
There are many ways for people to correct their behavior. This study limits this behavior to the
participants ' support for the foreign policy of their government. The same survey method has been
used in Wei, Lo, & Golan’s study (2017). This research requires participants to rate will they willing
to support their government to increase its global public relationship budget (US: M=3.55,
SD=1.412; Chinese: M=3.57, SD=.904), global foreign social media engagement budget
'(US:M=3.89, SD=1.491; Chinese: M=3.61, SD=.857), global TV broadcasting budget '(US: M=4.09,
SD=1.512; Chinese: M=3.71, SD=.872) and the budget improving its image abroad (US: M=3.14,
SD=1.512; Chinese: M=3.67, SD=1.032). As expected, measurement of participants’ corrective
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action also yielded strong reliability coefficients, a =. 844 and a =. 809, an additive index was
computed for this variable (M = 3.067 SD =. 589).

Hypothesis Testing
The first hypothesis is that respondents in both countries will generally feel that foreign media
reports about their own countries are biased. To calculate participants’ hostile media perception, this
study still followed previous research method which subtracting the hostile media perception from
personal opinion and revers coding the HMP score (Gunther et al., 2001; Choi et al, 2009; McLemore, 2015,
etc.). In this study both American participants (M =1.39, SD =1.365) and Chinese participants (M =

4.80, SD =2.288) showed the HMP phenomenon is widespread in both countries. In order to better
understanding HMP phenomenon, this study use both Paired-Samples T test and Independent T test
to further test H1, as well as compare the performance of HMP in China and the United States. The
results showed that there were significant differences between people's personal opinions (M = .33,
SD =1.355) and the perception of foreign media reports about their own country (M = -2.56, SD
=1.228), T (301) = 24.749, p = .000 in the United States; Chinese participants also showed
significant different opinion between personal opinions (M =1.72, SD =1.349) and the perception of
foreign media reports about their own country M = -3.09, SD =1.575, T (300) = 536.345, p = .000.
Furthermore, we found that American and Chinese participants show different level of HMP.
Specifically，the independent T test result shows that Chinese participants HMP (M =4.80, SD
=2.288) is much more higher than Americans (M =1.39, SD =1.365), T (601) = 12.497, p = 000.
The second hypothesis holds that the higher the group identification, the greater the HMP will be. To
test this hypothesis, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to evaluate the relationship
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between GI and HMP. The results showed a statistically significant positive correlation between GI
and HMP, in both American (r =.540, N = 301, p = .000) and China (r =.652, N = 300, p = .000).
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported. To further discuss the relationship between GI and HMP, we
conducted a further regression analysis of these two variables, and the results showed that GI can
predict the degree of HMP to some extent in both American (b=.461, p=.000) and Chinese (b=1.690,
p=.000).
The third hypothesis believes that IPI will be positively related to people supporting for
government's foreign policy. To test this hypothesis, multiple linear regression method was used to
evaluate the relationship between the independent variable (corrective action) and independent
variables (IPI1- influence on themselves, IPI2- influence on Chinese/Americans, IPI3- influence on
the people in other countries). The results show that both American participants presumed influence
of Chinese media coverage about the US on themselves (b= -.022, p=.000); on Chinese (b= .421,
p=.000); on people in other country (b= .165, p=.000) and Chinese participants presumed influence
of American media coverage about China on themselves (b= .408, p=.000); on Americans (b= .344,
p=.000); on people in other country (b= .292, p=.000) were all significant and positive predictor of
corrective action (support for government increase the budget on public relationship). However, the
IPI evaluate by American participants on themselves (b=-.028, p=.466) did not shows the statistic
significant associate with corrective actions. Thus H3 are partly supported.

Model Analysis
In this paper, ML method in AMOS software is used to estimate the coefficient of SEM model. This
approach was considered to produce more reliable estimates (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). Besides,
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the standardized coefficients are given to measure the coefficients between different paths. X2, Root
Mean Square Residual (RMR), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Goodness of
Fit Index (GFI), Confirmatory Fit Index (CFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Independence (AIC) and
the p of close fit (PCLOSE) was used to evaluate the model fit. In order to test the invariance of
measurement, we set Group Identification (GI), Media credibility (MC), Hostile Media Perception
(HMP), Influence of Presumed Influence (IPI) and constructive Action(A) as potential variables.
After preliminary analysis, we obtained the initial model (chi-square =284.088, df=70, GFI=.852,
RMSEA=.127, RMR=.144, CFI=.796, NFI=.746, AIC=321.078). Violation estimation and model fit
test are used to observe the degree of consistency between the measurement model and the observed
data. Generally, a good model fit is considered to have: chi-square value as small as possible; GFI >
0.9; RMR < 0.05; RMSEA<0.05 excellent (0.05-0.08, good; 0.08-0.1, moderate; >0.1 bad); NFI >
0.9, CFI > 0.9; And the smallest possible AIC value. Since the results of the initial model did not
meet the criteria of the rational model, we modified the initial model by Modificatiit inde-on Index
(MI). After freed paths among the variables and removing non-significant variables, the final model
is obtained (chi-square =148.151, df =67, GFI=.904, RMSEA=.081, RMR=.097, CFI=.933,
NFI=.870, AIC=224.151), as shown in figure 2. It can be found that chi-square of the optimal model
decreased significantly after adjustment, CGF value reached the optimal model standard, RMSEA
value was close to 0.8, CFI value was greater than 0.9, and AIC value also decreased significantly.
The results show that our best model can fit the original data well and carry out practical analysis
and discussion.
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Figure 2. Structural equation model of HMP phenomenon
*Information provided by the student for the purposes of this study.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The current study aims to study whether there is an HMP in Chinese and American citizens'
attitudes towards foreign media's reports about their own countries. What role did ‘Group
Identification’ play? Will Hostile media perception induced ‘Influence of Presumed Influence’
directly lead to people's "corrective action"? What are the differences between Chinese and
American participants? An online questionnaire was used to assess the HMP phenomenon reported
by foreign media in China by Chinese and American people. Three key results from the hypothesis
and data analysis are described and explained in this section. An online questionnaire was used to
assess the views of Chinese and American people on foreign media coverage of their own countries.
Three key results from the hypothesis and data analysis are described and explained in this section.
The first investigation hypothesis focuses on whether the HMP phenomenon of foreign media is
prevalent in China and the United States. All the participants are not asked to evaluate specific news
reports, but rather foreign media's reports about the country as a whole. This is anchored in the HMP
reference. The essence of hostile media perception does not depend on the media content itself, but
people's subjective perception (Hwang, Pan, Sun, 2008). T-test results of paired samples showed that
there was a statistically significant difference between the two dimensions of Hostile Media
Perception (personal opinions & opinions on media reports) in American (t (301) =24.749, p<.000)
and China (t (300) =36.345, p<.000). In addition, American participants’ hostile media perception of
Chinese media coverage about the U.S. (M=1.92, SD=1.839) was found to be less than Chinese
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participants’ hostile media perception of US media coverage about China (M=2.34, SD=1.766) (t
(601) =512.497, p<.000).
As for the causes of hostile media, this study explores the influence of people's involvement in
in-group. In this process, people will achieve the realization of social identity and the completion of
social cognition by keeping consistent with the cognition of their group (Tuner, et Al., 1987).
According to previous studies on hostile media perception, audiences' different definitions and
degrees of involvement in in-group will directly lead to different perceptions and degrees of hostile
media (Ginersorolla, Chaiken, 1994; Oh, Park, 2011; Kim, 2011, etc.). Therefore, as one of the most
important influencing factors, ‘Group Identification’ is predicted to have the most direct impact on
people's perception of media bias.
The second hypothesis of this study is that the higher the ‘Group identification’ of the Chinese and
American participants, the deeper the HMP will be generated. According to the analysis, there was a
statistically significant positive correlation between two variables, and group identification (GI)
plays a certain role in predicting participants’ hostile media perception (HMP) (American: b=.540
p<.000; China: b=.652, p<.000). This result complements previous studies on GI and HMP (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2000, etc). Besides, This
result， to some extent, explains why Chinese participants showed higher HMP than American
participants.
In addition to the degree to which GI affects HMP, we believe that different media environment
may also cause explain the reason why people in different countries perceived media bias differently.
It has to be admitted that the media environment in China and the United States is extremely
different. Fundamentally, the role of the media in the two countries is quite different due to their
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different polity and political environment. It has to be admitted that the media environment in China
and the United States is very different. Fundamentally speaking, the role of the media in the two
countries is quite different due to their different polity and political environment. In China, the news
media is the mouthpiece of the Chinese communist party and government (introduction to
journalism: Li Liangrong, 2005). As an important part of the whole cause of the party, the news
media must adhere to the principle of party spirit (Jiang, 1989). In addition, China is a one-party
state, so it is conceivable that Chinese media have a relatively positive evaluation of China, which
indirectly shapes the Chinese people's extraordinarily optimistic attitude towards China. Due to the
multi-party political system in the United States, the press environment is relatively free. A batch of
media with a certain political tendency was generated, such as CNN, FOX News, etc. Because the
American public has long been accustomed to different views in the media, it indirectly leads to a
more open attitude towards views that may do not agree with them.
H3 of this study explores the relationship between Influence of Presumed Influence (IPI) and
consequences - 'corrective action'. Based on the literature of hostile media perception, scholars have
suggested that perceptions of the strong influence of biased media coverage will indirectly led
people increased the willingness to implement relevant corrective actions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005;
Cohen & Tsfati, 2009; Golan & Lim, 2016; Wei, Lo, & Golan, 2017, etc.). What we can find from
most the results is that the perceived influence from bias media coverage of Chinese and American
participants will directly lead to their support for the government's public relations. However, the
result did not show any statistically significant relationship between American perceived impact
from bias media coverage on themselves and willingness to support government public relationship
(b=-.028, p=.466).
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To be more specific, as we predicted above, Chinese participants generally believe that biased media
covers affect others more than themselves. They argue that biased American media coverage of
China affects Americans (M=3.49, SD=.902) more than people in other countries (M=3.48,
SD=.820), and themselves (M=3.12, SD=.919) are the least affected. This is understandable, since
previous research has shown that people subconsciously assume that others are more susceptible to
media effects when they pay attention to media covers than they are (Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber,
& McLeod, 1999; Gunther, & Store, 2003; Tsfati & Cohe, 2005, etc). In addition, since biased media
covers produced by American media, participants will assume that the involvement of American
audiences is much higher than that of participants in other countries, which leads to greater influence
on American participants. At the same time, it is theoretically consistent with the academic theory
that involvement of participants affects HMP (Giner-Sorolla, & Chaiken, 1994; Hwang, et al. 2008;
Kim, 2011). But interestingly, we found that American participants in this study generally believed
that bias media coverage had a greater impact on people in other countries (M=3.53, SD=.913) than
on themselves (M=3.29, SD=1.065) than on the Chinese (M=3.18, SD=.974). In other words, they
believe that Chinese media coverage of American has far less impact on Chinese people than people
in other countries and themselves. Perhaps the reason for this phenomenon may because the
differences between two countries' social (political) systems. We believe this will be an interesting
subject for future research.
Finally, in order to test the proposed causal model, structural equation modeling is carried out. The
results show our model is significant important (chi-square =148.151, df =67, GFI=.904,
RMSEA=.081, RMR=.097, CFI=.933, NFI=.870, AIC=224.151). As shown in the following, SEM
model shows that people's group identity had a direct effect on hostile media perception (B=.404,
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p<.001) and had negative effect on media credibility (B=-.398, P <.001). People's media credibility
also influenced on hostile media perception (B=-.476, P<. 001). Besides people's hostile media
perception had directly impacted on influence of presumed influence (B=.731, P<. 001).
Furthermore, people’s perception of biased media coverage had also direct effect on corrective
action (B = .752, p <. 001). The results can also support data analysis for H2 and H3 hypothesis.
The present study is try to address how do American and Chinese people perceived the
influence from Chinese or US media coverage about their own country? Besides, how do individuals
think people from other countries will influenced by the media coverage that they think biased.
Finally, how would presumed influence affect individuals ‘corrective’ actions by supporting
government global public relations campaigns and international broadcasting services.
To solving above three problems, this study can supplement the application of IPI model in
HMP. Secondly it can provide more powerful evidence for HMP theory in an international
communication environment. Third, it can provide meaningful reference for international relation
institutions.
In theory, use the IPI model in HMP study proposed by Shen & Huggins in 2013. They argue
that IPI model can explain how people’s perception changes after receiving media bias. However,
there are very few studies that officially apply the IPI model to HMP research. Therefore, this study
is looking forward to make the supplement for this field.
Although there has been a lot of research on HMP in international communication background
in the past, most of the study are limited to test how media coverage of one country influence people
from the other country. Although the research scope of media hostility is very wide, some scholars
have expressed the need to study it from the perspective of critical culture (Ganther, 1992). This
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study aims to compare countries from different politic systems. We hope this study can provide more
comprehensive and systematically comparison about HMP in international communication
environment.
In the end, the results also provide useful advises to international relation institutions and policy
makers. Wei, Lo and Golan (2017) indicated that the influence of presumed influence will not only
lead individuals support for the censorship but also the corrective actions to face the negative
influences. Moreover, they suggest further research can focus on IPI in the context of western
countries such as United States. Thus, this study aimed to offer the practical guidance about the
potential influence of presumed media influence on public opinion.
In the field of international communication, global public relationship is one of the important
ways to help a country provide credibility and external image. Thus it has been used as the main way
to correct the behavior in this study. Thus, it is used in this study as the way to test people's desire to
carry out "corrective action". This is because global public relationship is a way to realize
international political intention and influence by taking a country as a whole and utilizing various
power resources to changing people or institutions’ value judgment other countries. With the general
development of mass politics in the world, the government's political judgment and policy choices
are more involved by public opinion and public cognition. In the new environment, public
relationship is transformed into 'building preference', that is, seeking ways to change the value
judgment and target selection of other countries by persuading, attracting or taking advantage of
information asymmetry. Therefore, when the government increases the investment in public relations
with foreign countries, it also needs to pay more attention to the ways of information exchange and
value transmission to foreign society and people, so as to better adapt to the environment of
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globalization and digital age.
The current study has some limitations. Since the snowball sampling procedure has been used in this
study. Participants are likely to rely on personal and professional connections, as well as social
media, to disseminate the questionnaire, which means that participants may shape the demographic
and attitude information differently in this study. In addition, this method of research design in the
form of online questionnaire which requires participants to have certain technical and Internet access
capabilities, which may limit the potential respondents.
Furthermore, the age distribution of the participants in this study is a limiting factor, especially 89.3
of the participants in China (N=300) are between 18 and 35 years old. This skewed age distribution
is likely to cause differences in perceptions of media bias.
Future studies may consider testing the hypotheses of this study in different situations. The
potential research package compares domestic and foreign media coverage of the country. In
addition, qualitative research methods, such as controlled experiments, focus groups and in-depth
interviews, can be considered. Besides, the current study can also be replicated in other countries and
different populations. In the future, this kind of research will supplement the findings of the existing
research and further explore and discover the globalization of international communication.
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APPENDIX A
TABLES

Table 1
T-test for Personal Opinion (PO) and Media Bias (MB) in America:
Paired Samples Test
Paired differences
95
% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean
1

Pair 1 PO-MB
MB

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

2.89413

2.02886

Lower

.11694

Upper

2.66400

3.12126

Paired Samples Test

t
Pair 1

Pair 1 -PO-MB
MB

df

24.746

Sig.(two- tail)
300

.000

Table 2
T-test for Personal Opinion (PO) and Media Bias (MB) in China:
Paired Samples Test
Paired differences
95
% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean
Pair 1 PO-MB
Pair 1- MB

4.80089

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

2.28792

Lower
.13209

69

4.54094

Upper
5.06084

Table 2 (Continued)
Paired Samples Test

t
Pair 1

Pair 1 -PO-MB
MB

df

36.345

Sig.(two- tail)
299

.000

Table 3
T-test the different between American and Chinese participants on Hostile Media perception (HMP).
Independent Sample Test
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances

t-test for Equality of Means

Sig.
F
Equal
variancesassumed
HMP HMPEqual
variances
assumed

Equal

variances

Sig.
170.126

t
.000

not

12.629
12.497

Equal variances

assumed

not assumed

Independent Sample Test

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Std. Error Difference Lower
HMP HMPEqual
variances
Equal
variancesassumed
assumed

Equal variances not assumed

Upper

.09896

1.05544

1.44416

.10000

1.05319

1.44641

Equal variances
not assumed
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df

390.957

(2-tailed) Mean Difference
.000

1.24980

.000

1.24980

Table 4
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Group Identification (GI) and Hostile Media Perception (HMP)
in American:
Model Summary

Model Model

R

R Square
.540a

Adjusted R Square

.291

Std. Error of the Estimate

.290

1.15005

a. Predictors (Constant), GI
a. Predictors (Constant), GI
Model Summary
Change Statistics
Model

Model

R Square Change
.291

1

F Change

df1

245.740

df2
1

Sig. F Change

298

.000

Anovab
Model

Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

325.018

1

325.018

Residual
Residual

790.921

299

1.323

1115.938

300

Regression

TotalTotal

F
245.740

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors
(Constant),
GI GI
a. Predictors
(Constant),
b. Dependent Variable: HMP

b. Dependent Variable: HMP

Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized CoefficientsCoefficients
Model

Model
(Constant)
1 (Constant)
GI

B

Std. Error

-.642

.138

.461

.029

Beta

t

.540

a. Independent
Variable:
HMP
a. Independent
Variable:
HMP HMP
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Sig.

-4.649

.000

15.676

.000

Table 5
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Group Identification (GI) and Hostile Media Perception (HMP)
in China:
Model Summary

Model

Model

R

R Square
.652a

Adjusted R Square

.426

Std. Error of the Estimate

.424

1.73689

Predictors: (Constant), GI

a. Predictors: (Constant), GI

Change Statistics
Model

Model

R Square Change

F Change

.426

df1

220.808

df2
1

Sig. F Change
298

.000

Anovab

Model

Model

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

666.133

Residual
Residual

899.004

298

1565.138

299

Regression

Total
Total

1

666.133

F

Sig.

220.808

3.017

a. Predictors
(Constant),
a. Predictors
(Constant),
GI GI
b. Dependent Variable: HMP

b. Dependent Variable: HMP

Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

-4.599

.640

1.690

.114

Beta

t

Sig.

-7.180

.000

14.860

.000

(Constant)
GI

.652

a. Independent
Variable
: HMPHMP
a. Independent
Variable:

72

.000a

Table 6
Multiple regression analysis prediction participants support for government’s public relationship in
America:

Coefficients
A
Pearson

correlation

Pearson correlation A
IPI1
IPI2

IPI1

IPI2

IPI3

1.000

.114

.437

.218

.114

1.000

.266

.179

.437

.266

1.000

.138

.218

.179

.138

IPI3

Sig. (two-taileds）
Sig. (two – tailed) A

.

1.000

.003

.000

.000

.003

.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

A

301

301

301

301

IPI1

301

301

301

301

301

301

301

301

301

301

IPI1
IPI2

.

.000

IPI3

N

IPI2

301

IPI3

301

Model Summary

Model Model

R
.466a

R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.217

.213

.76206

a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1, IPI2,
a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1, IPI3
IPI2,

Model Summary
Change Statistics
Model Model

R Square Change
.217

F Change
55.112

df1

df2
3

297

73

Sig. F Change
.000

Table 6 (Continued)
Anovab
Model Model

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

96.016

3

32.005

Residual
Residual

346.696

297

.581

Total
Total

442.713

300

Regression

F

Sig.
.000a

55.112

a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1,
IPI2,
IPI3
a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1,
IPI2,
IPI3
b. Dependent
Variable:
b. Dependent
Variable:
A A

Coefficientsa
Standardized

95

Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model

Model
N (Constant)
(Constant)
IPI1
IPI2

B

Std. Error

1.414

.161

-.022

.031

.371
.155

Beta

% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Upper

Sig.

Lower

Upper

8.781

.000

1.097

1.730

-.028

-.729

.466

-.083

.038

.033

.421

11.166

.000

.306

.437

.035

.165

4.461

.000

.087

.224

IPI3

a. Independent
Variable:
A A
a. Independent
Variable:

74

Table 7
Multiple regression analysis prediction participants support for government’s public relationship in
China:
Coefficients
A
PearsonPearson
correlation
correlation A

PIP1

PIP2

PIP3

1.000

.535

.472

.570

.535

1.000

.052

.373

PIP2

.472

.052

1.000

.365

PIP3

.570

.373

.365

1.000

.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

.186

.000

.000

.186

.

.000

PIP3

.000

.000

.000

.

A

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

300

IPI1

PIP1

IPI2
IPI3

Sig. (two-taileds）
Sig. (two – tailed) A
IPI1
PIP1
IPI2

PIP2

IPI3

N

IPI1
PIP1
IPI2

PIP2

IPI3

PIP3

Model Summary

Model Model

R
.740a

R Square

Adjusted R Square

.547

Std. Error of the Estimate

.543

.49537

a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1,
a. Predictors
(Constant),
IPI1,IPI2,
IPI2,IPI3
IPI3

Model Summary
Change Statistics
Model Model

R Square Change
.547

F Change
119.240

df1

df2
3

296
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Sig. F Change
.000

Table 7 (Contiued)
Anovab
Model Model

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

87.781

3

29.260

Residual
Residual

72.635

296

.245

Regression

Total
Total

F

Sig.

119.240

.000a

160.417 299

a. Predictors
(Constant), IPI1, IPI2, IPI3
a. Predictors (Constant), IPI1, IPI2, IPI3
b. Dependent
Variable:
A A
b. Dependent
Variable:

Coefficientsa
95
Standardized

% Confidence Interval of the

Unstandardized CoefficientsCoefficients
Model Model

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.735

.157

PIP1 IPI1

.325

.034

PIP2 IPI2

.280
.261

N

(Constant)

Beta

Difference
Upper

Sig.

Lower

Upper

4.675

.000

.425

1.044

.408

9.630

.000

.259

.391

.034

.344

8.157

.000

.212

.347

.041

.292

6.432

.000

.181

.341

IPI3

PIP3
a. Independent Variable: A

a. Independent Variable: A
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APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE: ENGLISH VERION

Survey (U.S. version)

Introduction page
Thank you your interest in our study on Americans’ perceptions of Chinese media coverage of the USA. This
study is anonymous and is open to any U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older. Thank you for your time.

ABOUT US
The researcher of this study is Zhennan Liu from The Zimmerman School of Advertising and Mass
Communications at University of South Florida. The purpose of this study is to better understand how people
process foreign media coverage of their country.
WHAT YOU WILL DO
You will be asked to choices and answer the questions about personal opinions on media coverage and it
influences. The average time to complete this survey is 10 to15 minutes. You can now choose to either proceed to
the next page for details OR close this page to exit if you do not wish to participate.
Consent Form Page
Your agreement indicates that you have read the consent form below:
you are a U.S. citizen at least 18 years of age;
your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this survey.
If you do not wish to continue, you may now close this window.
(*Followed by a checkbox next to the statement: “I understand and wish to proceed with the experiment.”)

CONSENT FORM
RISKS: There are no known risks associated with participating in this project. You are asked to read and respond
online questioner. This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help us to understand
more about how people look on the foreign media coverage based on their own perspective. We hope that, in the
future, others may benefit from this study through improved understanding of these effects.
PRIVACY : We will do our best to keep your provided data confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, data
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collected through the survey will remain anonymous and will not contain information that may personally identify
you. Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a password-protected computer.
RIGHT TO TERMINATE AT ANY TIME: Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose
not to take part at all. If you decide to participate, you may stop at any time. You will not be otherwise penalized
or lose any other benefits to which you otherwise qualify.
If you have questions, concerns, complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please
contact the investigators: Zhennan Liu (Email: zhennanl@mail.usf.edu, Office: 813-230-6910).
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please
contact:
USF Institutional Review Boards
Research Integrity and Compliance
12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd.
MOV035, Tampa, FL
Zip code: 33612-4799
Tel: (813) 974-5638.
This research has been reviewed according to the University of South Florida, IRB procedures for research
involving human subjects. Your signature indicates that you have read this consent form or have had it read to you;
your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research
study. You may now print this page if you would like a copy of this consent form or you can email us for a copy of
the form.

Before you start the survey, we need to ask :
1. What is your nationality?
a. American
b. Others
Please to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= somehow disagree; 4= neutral; 5= somehow agree; 6= agree;
7= strongly agree)

2. I feel a strong sense of belonging to the United States.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

3. Other countries can learn a lot from the United States.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree
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Strongly
Agree

4. Being American is an important part of who I am.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

5. Compared to other countries, the United States is particularly good.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

6. It is important to me that I view myself as American.
Neutral
Strongly
1
--------2
--------3
--------4
--------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

7. All Americans should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leadership of the United
States.

Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

8. I am strongly committed to the United States
Neutral
Strongly
1
--------2
--------3
--------4
--------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

9. Relative to other countries, the United States is a very moral country.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree
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Strongly
Agree

10. It is important to me that others see me as American.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

11. It is disloyal to criticize the United States.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

12. I am glad to make contribution to the United States.
Strongly
Agree

Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

13. The United States is better than other countries in all respects.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

14. When I talk about Americans, I usually say “we” rather than “they”.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

15. There is usually a good reason why American leaders support US foreign policy.
Neutral
Strongly
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

16. How would you describe your attitude towards China regarding:
Negative
Very

a. China’s Government

Neutral

Positive

Very
Positive

Negative
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b. China’s Foreign Policy

c. China’s role in the world
d. China’s economic policies
e. The Chinese people

17. How would you describe your attitude towards the USA regarding:
Very
Negative

Very
Negative

Neutral

Positive

Positive

a. The US Government
b. The US Foreign Policy
c. The US role in the world
d. The US economic policies
e. The American people
18. How would you describe Chinese media coverage of the United States?
(-4 = strongly biased against; 0 = strictly neutral; +4 = strongly biased in favor )
Strictly Neutral
Strongly
(-4) ------ (-3) ------ (-2) ------ (-1) ------ (0) ------ (1) ------ (2) ------ (3) ------ (4)
Biased
Against

Strongly
Biased
In Favor

19. What percentage if any of Chinese media coverage biased against the United States?(0% =
none; 100% = all)
None0%----10%----20%----30%----40%----50%----60%----70%---80%----90%----100%

All

20. As far as you can tell what is your perception about how Chinese journalists and editors cover
the United States?
(-4 = strongly biased against; 0 = strictly neutral; +4 = strongly biased in favor )
Strongly
Biased
Against

Strictly Neutral
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Strongly
Biased
In Favor

(-4) ------ (-3) ------ (-2) ------ (-1) ------ (0) ------ (1) ------ (2) ------ (3) ------ (4)
21. How would you describe Chinese media coverage of the United States?
Unfair

Fair

Inaccurate

Accurate

Unreliable

Reliable

Incomplete

Complete

Beneficial
to the community

Not beneficial
to the community at all

22. To what extent do you think that Chinese media coverage of the United States may influence
your opinion of：
：
No

Great

influence

influence

a. The United States.
b. The US government.
c.

The American values.

d. The American people.
e. The American companies.

23. To what extent do you think that Chinese media coverage of the United States may influence
Chinese people’s opinion of：
：
No

Very little

influence

influence

a. The USA.
b. The USA Government.
c. The USA values.
d. The USA People.
e. The USA companies
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Neutral

Somewhat

Great

influence

influence

24. To what extent do you think that Chinese media coverage of the United States may influence
international audiences’ views of：
：
No
influence

Very little

Neutral

influence

Somewhat

Great

influence

influence

a. The USA.
b. The USA Government.
c. The USA values.
d. The USA People.
e. The USA companies
25. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat Neutral Somewhat
Disagree
Agree

Strongly
Agree

a. The USA needs to
increase its global
public relationship
budget.
b. The USA needs to
increase its global
foreign social media
engagement budget.
c. The USA needs to
increase its global TV
broadcasting budget.

d. The USA needs to
priorities improving
its image abroad.

26. Please tell us your opinions about China in general:
Enemy

Friend

Negative

Positive
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Make the world
Dangers
27. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
c. Other

Make the world
safe

28. What is your age?
___ (Put a number to indicate your age)
29. Your race / ethnicity is:
a. White
b. Black
c. Hispanic
d. Asian
e. Other or multiracial
f. Prefer not to answer
30. How would you describe your political ideology?
Moderate
Strong
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Democrat

1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
Conservative

Strong
Republican
Liberal

31. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you’re currently
enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have received.)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Less than a high school diploma
High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED)
Some college, no degree
Associate degree (e.g. AA, AS)

e.
f.
g.
h.

Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS)
Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd)
Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM)
Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD)

Thank you for taking our survey! Your response is very important to us. If you have any questions about the
survey, please feel free to email: zhennanl@mail.usf.edu.
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APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE: CHINESE VERION

调查问卷
介绍
感谢您对我们研究中国人对美国媒体中关于中国报道的课题感兴趣。这项研究是匿名的，对所
有 18 岁或以上的中国公民开放。感谢您的支持。
关于我们
这项研究的研究人员是来自南佛罗里达大学齐默尔曼广告和大众传播学院的研究员 Zhennan
Liu。本研究的目的是更好地了解人们如何处理外国媒体对其国家的报道。
您需要做什么
您将被要求做出选择并回答有关媒体报道及其影响的个人意见的问题。完成此调查的平均时间
为 10 到 15 分钟。您现在可以选择进入下一页以获取详细信息，或者如果您不想参加，请关闭
此页面以退出。
同意书
您的协议表明您已阅读下面的同意书：
您是至少 18 岁的中国公民;
您对本研究的疑问已得到满意答复，并且您自愿同意参与此调查。
如果您不想继续，可以关闭此窗口。
（*后跟一个复选框声明旁边：“我理解并希望继续进行实验。”）
同意书
风险：参与此项目没有已知的风险。您被要求阅读并回复在线问卷。这项研究的宗旨并非是
风险
对您个人提供帮助，但结果可能有助于我们更多地了解人们如何根据自己的观点看待外国媒体
报道。我们希望，将来其他人可以从这项研究中更好地理解这些影响并从中受益。
隐私：我们会尽力保密您提供的数据。为了保护您的隐私，通过调查收集的数据将保持匿名，
隐私：
不包含可能会识别您个人身份的信息。并将将数据存储在受密码保护的计算机中，以最大限度
地减少任何潜在泄露隐私的可能性。
随时终止的权利：您参与此项研究完全是自愿的。你可以选择不参加。即使您决定参加，您
随时终止的权利：
也可以随时停止。您不会受到其他方面的处罚或失去您有资格获得的任何其他福利。
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如果您有任何问题、疑虑、投诉，或者感受到任何由于研究导致的相关伤害，请联系调查人员：
Zhennan Liu（电子邮件：zhennanl@mail.usf.edu，办公室：813-230-6910）。
如果您对作为研究参与者的权利有疑问或希望举报研究相关的伤害，请联系：
南佛罗里达大学机构审查委员会
研究诚信与合规 办公室
12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd.
MOV035，Tampa, FL
邮编：33612-4799
电话：（813）974-5638。
该研究已经接受了涉及人类接受誓实验的 IRB 程序审查。您的签名表明您已阅读或收听了此
同意书、您的疑问已得到满意的答复，并且您自愿同意参与此研究。如果您需要此同意书的副
本，您现在可以打印此页面，或者您可以通过电子邮件向我们索取表格的副本。
在您开始填写调查问卷之前，我们需要问您。
1. 你的国籍是？
a. 中国
b. 其他国家

请说明您在何种程度上同意或不同意以下的说法：
（1 =非常不同意; 2 =不同意; 3 =某种程度上不同意; 4 =中立; 5 =不知何故同意; 6 =同意; 7 =非
常同意）
2. 我觉得自己对中国有很强的归属感。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
不同意
同意

3. 其他国家可以从中国这里学到很多东西。
中立
非常
非常
1--------2
--------3
--------4
--------5
--------6
--------不同意
同意7

4. 作为一名中国人是回答我是谁的重要组成部分。
中立
非常
非常
同意7
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------不同意

5. 与其他国家相比中国是格外好的国家。
非常
不同意

中立

非常
同意
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1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
6. 我是一名中国人这对我很重要。
中立
非常
非常
1
--------2
--------3
--------4
--------5
--------6
--------7
不同意
同意

7. 所有中国人都应该尊重中国的习俗机构和领导人。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
不同意
同意

8. 我与中国的联系非常紧密。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
不同意
同意

9. 相对于其他国家中国是一个非常有道德的国家。
中立
非常
非常
不同意 1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------同意7

10. 其他人把我当做一个中国人这对我来说很重要。
中立
非常
非常
1
--------2
--------3
--------4
--------5
--------6
--------不同意
同意7

11. 作为中国人批评中国是不忠诚的。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------同意7
不同意

12. 我很乐意为中国做出贡献。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------同意7
不同意

、、
13. 中国在各方面都优于其他国家。
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中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
不同意
同意

14. 当我谈到中国人时我通常说我们而不是他们。
中立
非常
非常
7
不同意1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------同意

15. 中国领导人提出的外交政策都具备充分的理由。
中立
非常
非常
1 --------- 2 --------- 3 --------- 4 --------- 5 --------- 6 --------- 7
不同意
同意

16. 描述您的态度：
对中国政府
非常
非常
（-4）
）------（
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）------（
（4）
）
消极
积极

对中国整体
非常
非常
（-4）
）------（
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）------（
（4）
）
消极
积极

中国在全球的角色
非常
非常
（
-4）
）
------（
（
-3）
）
------（
（
-2）
）
------（
（
-1）
）
------（
（
0）
）
------（
（
1）
）
------（
（
2）
）
------（
（
3）
）
------（
（4）
）
消极
积极

中国经济政策
非常
非常
（-4）
）------（
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）------（
（4）
）
消极
积极

中国人民
非常
非常
（
-4）
）
------（
（
-3）
）
------（
（
-2）
）
------（
（
-1）
）
------（
（
0）
）
------（
（
1）
）
------（
（
2）
）
------（
（
3）
）
------（
（4）
）
消极
积极
中立

17. 您认为美国媒体对中国的报道对中国是强烈反对还是支持的？
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（-4 =强烈反对中国; 0 =中立; +4 =强烈支持中国）
强烈
强烈
中立
支持
反对
（-4）
）------（
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）------（
）
中国（4）
中国

18. 您认为，大约有百分之多少美国媒体对中国的报道对美中关系有利/不利？
您认为，大约有百分之多少美国媒体对中国的报道对美中关系有利 不利？
（0％=无; 100％=全部）
全部
％---- 10％
％---- 20％
％---- 30％
％---- 40％
％---- 50％
％---- 60％
％---- 70％
％---- 80％
％ ---- 90 ----％
％
100％
％
无0％

19. 您认为负责媒体报道中国的美国记者或编辑是偏向于支持还是反对中国？
（-4 =强烈反对中国; 0 =严格中立; +4 =强烈支持中国）
强烈
强烈
中立
支持
反对
（-4）
）------（
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）------（
（4）
）
中国
中国

媒体信誉
20. 您将如何描述美国媒体关于中国的报道在以下几方面的表现？
中立

不公平

公平

不准确

准确

不可信

可信

不完整

完整

对社会有益

对社会无益

影响力感知
影响力感知
21. 在谈到以下话题时，您认为美国媒体关于中国的报道对您
在谈到以下话题时，您认为美国媒体关于中国的报道对您影响有多大：
没有
影响
f.

很大
影响

中国
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g. 中国政府
h. 中国价值观
i.

中国人民

j.

中国公司

22. 在谈到以下话题时，您认为美国媒体关于中国的报道对美国人影响有多大：

没有
影响

很少
影响

中立

一些
影响

很大
影响

f. 中国
g. 中国政府
h. 中国价值观
i. 中国人民
j. 中国公司

23. 在谈到以下话题时，您认为美国媒体关于中国的报道对美国人影响有多大：

没有
影响

很少
影响

中立

一些
影响

很大
影响

中立

有些
同意

强烈
同意

e. 中国
f. 中国政府
g. 中国价值观
h. 中国人民
i. 中国公司

24. 在何种程度上同意或不同意以下陈述:
在何种程度上同意或不同意以下陈述
强烈
反对

有些
反对
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e. 中国需要增加有关
全球国际关系
的预算
f. 中国需要增加参与
外国社交媒体
的预算
g. 中国需要增加
多种语言
电视服务
的预算

h. 中国需要把提高
本国在国外的
国家形象
放在首位

25. 请描述您对美国的整体看法：
敌意的

友好的

消极的

积极的

把世界变得危险

把世界变得安全

26. 您的性别是什么？
a. 男
b. 女
c．其他
．其他
27. 您的年龄是多少？
a. 18-25
b. 26-30
c. 31-35
d. 36-40
e. 41-45
f. 46-50
g. 51+
28. 您的种族是:
您的种族是
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

白人
黑人
西班牙裔
亚裔
其他种族或混血
不想回答

29. 您的政治意识形态更偏向共产党其他党派还是无党派温和派?
您的政治意识形态更偏向共产党其他党派还是无党派温和派
温和派/无党派人士
温和派 无党派人士
非常支持
非常支持
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
）其他党派
中国共产党

30. 的政治意识形态偏保守还是自由

中立
非常自由
非常保守派
（-3）
）------（
（-2）
）------（
（-1）
）------（
（0）
）------（
（ 1）
）------（
（2）
）------（
（3）
） 派

31. 您完成的最高学历是多少？ （如果您目前就读于学校，请选择您获得的最高学位。）
a. 高中以下
b. 高中毕业或同等学历（比如：GED）
C. 大学（无学历）
d. 副学士学位（例如 AA，AS）
e. 学士学位（例如 BA, BS）
F. 硕士学位（例如 MA，
，MS，
，MEd）
）
G. 专业学位（例如 MD，
，DDS，
，DVM）
）
H. 博士学位（例如 PhD，
，EdD）
）
非常感谢您参与我们的调查，您的回答对我们很重要。如果您对这次的调查有任何疑问，欢
迎您发送邮件到：zhennanl@mail.usf.edu。
。
迎您发送邮件到：
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APPENDIX D
IRB APPROVAL LETTER
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